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Abstract
Intrusion Detection and/or Prevention Systems (IDPS) represent an important line of de-
fense against a variety of attacks that can compromise the security and proper functioning
of an enterprise information system. IDPSs can be network or host-based and can col-
laborate in order to provide better detection of malicious traffic. Although several IDPS
systems have been proposed, their appropriate configuration and control for effective de-
tection/prevention of attacks and efficient resource consumption is still far from trivial.
Another concern is related to the slowing down of system performance when maximum
security is applied, hence the need to trade off between security enforcement levels and the
performance and usability of an enterprise information system.
In this dissertation, we present a security management framework for the configuration
and control of the security enforcement mechanisms of an enterprise information system.
The approach leverages the dynamic adaptation of security measures based on the assess-
ment of system vulnerability and threat prediction, and provides several levels of attack
containment. Furthermore, we study the impact of security enforcement levels on the
performance and usability of an enterprise information system. In particular, we analyze
the impact of an IDPS configuration on the resulting security of the network, and on the
network performance. We also analyze the performance of the IDPS for different configu-
rations and under different traffic characteristics. The analysis can then be used to predict
the impact of a given security configuration on the prediction of the impact on network
performance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Security threats come in a variety of forms, and new attacks are crafted on a daily basis from
a variety of malicious sources and for different reasons, ranging from competitor-planned
intrusions to amateur explorations. Intrusion types include worms, spam, viruses, buffer-
overflow, denial-of-service (DoS), rootkits, malicious logins, etc. The increasing network
connectivity of today’s computing environments has significantly increased the potential
damage that can be caused by these intrusions. The possible economic loss from a cyber-
attack is sometimes unfathomable. For instance, the five most costly viruses of all time
came to USD 102 billion in losses, where the most expensive single virus was MyDoom at
USD 38.7 billion [60].
Among other security enforcement tools and mechanisms, Intrusion Detection and Pre-
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vention Systems (IDPS) [235] represent an important line of defense against the variety
of attacks that can compromise the security and proper functioning of an enterprise infor-
mation system. IDPSs can be signature-based or anomaly-based. Signature-based IDPSs,
such as Snort [230] and Bro [223], are the most dominant and are based on pre-knowledge of
attack signatures, which help identify malicious from benign traffic. Anomaly-based IDPSs
work differently in that they learn about the normal behavior of a system and then raise
alerts whenever abnormal behavior is detected. IDPSs can be network- or host-based, and
can collaborate in centralized or distributed clusters in order to provide better detection
of malicious traffic across a distributed networked system.
The issue of optimal IDPS configuration and provisioning has always been difficult
to deal with, mainly due to the overwhelming number of parameters to tune. IDPSs are
generally shipped with a number of attack detection libraries (also known as categories [230]
or analyzers [223]) with a considerable set of configuration parameters. The current version
of the Snort IDPS (version 2.9) [230], for example, has approximately 21,500 signature rules
in fifty eight categories. Each IDPS also comes with a default configuration to use when no
additional information or expertise is available. It is not trivial to determine the optimal
configuration of an IDPS because it is essential to understand the quantitative relationship
between the wide range of analyzers and tuning parameters. This explains the reason
why current IDPSs are configured and tuned based simply on a trial-and-error approach.
Although there have been recent approaches, such as in [237, 252, 273], to optimize IDPS
resource consumption, we still need to deal with resource constraints and make the best
use of an IDPS with available resource budgets.
The proper configuration and management of an IDPS for effective attack detection
2
and prevention and efficient resource consumption is very challenging. For instance the
configuration of the IDPS to enforce a maximum security level can negatively impact the
performance and usability of the enterprise information system being protected. A trade-off
between security and performance is necessary in this case which can be achieved through
proper configuration. The protection capability of an IDPS realized by deploying preventive
rules can significantly improve the security of the network. However, this can have a
negative impact on network performance in terms of delay as the number of preventive
rules increase. In addition, the IDPS may not be able to cope with the increase in the
amount of processed traffic, mainly because of limited resources in terms of CPU and
memory. The goal of this thesis is to study the trade-off between security and performance.
The approach envisioned to achieve this goal is to analyze the performance of a security
system and configure it in such a way to reduce performance bottleneck and preserve a
sufficient level of security enforcement. The key difficulty faced here is the determination
of the large number and variety of configuration parameters required for the analysis.
1.2 Challenges for IDPS Configuration Management
Although many IDPS systems have been proposed in the past, their proper configuration
and management for effective detection and prevention of attacks are still far from trivial.
A particularly important issue is the significant slowing down of system performance when
maximum security is applied; hence arises the need to tradeoff between security enforce-
ment levels on one hand and the performance and usability of an enterprise information
system on the other. In our work, we focus on designing a framework for an effective
3
and dynamic IDPS configuration which addresses such tradeoff. In particular, we identify
several key properties required for effective and manageable IDPSs. In this section, we
discuss common weaknesses of existing IDPSs and the key properties we want to consider
in our framework.
1.2.1 Security Enforcement and Performance
A primary requirement for the deployment of any security technology is the ability to pro-
tect against a range of attacks. Another requirement is related to avoiding performance
degradations in the network due to unnecessary security measures. Current IDPSs do not
provide adequate means of achieving these two conflicting requirements. We believe it is
essential to strike a balance between performance and security requirements [29]. IDPSs in
a detection mode (passive mode IDS) scrutinize copies of the packets sent over the network
and raise alerts whenever hostile content is found. In contrast, IDPSs in a preventive mode
(inline mode IPS) have the extra capability of preventing the attacks. IDSs fulfill network
performance requirements but display poor defense capabilities, as attacks succeed. On the
other hand, IPSs can shield networks by rejecting packets that match any malicious pat-
tern, but this can negatively impact network performance as traffic increases. Therefore,
modeling and analyzing the performance of IDPSs can be extremely useful in gaining a
deeper understanding of IDPSs’ behavior and characteristics. Furthermore, quantitatively
evaluating the impact of IDPS configurations on the security of the enterprise information
system is highly useful for security administrators for optimizing security configurations
and policies; for instance, predicting the impact of enabling some preventive rules in IDPS
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configurations on the resulting security of the system and on network performance is ex-
tremely valuable.
1.2.2 Dynamic Adaptation
The goal of dynamic adaptation of a security system is to adjust security enforcement
level while preserving good system performance, or vice versa. The current trend lays an
emphasis on fine-tuning the IDPS configuration to suit the environment and operating
conditions where the IDPS will be deployed for better performance [259]. Some IDPSs
are carefully designed to be very ”lightweight” or are specially configured with high-end
hardware (e.g., RealSecure with AppSwitch [180]) to cope with high-speed and high-volume
traffic. Most IDPSs are statically configured without considering changes in the operational
conditions. When the IDPS is under an overload condition due to a surge in the traffic
(e.g., under DDoS attack), the value of the IDPS will drop as its configuration is not valid
anymore. This problem is most often dismissed with the argument that it is acceptable
if the IDPS drops some packets when there is a traffic spike. However, the fact is that
the attacker can deliberately increase the traffic to ”hide” the attack. In such cases, the
reason for deploying the IDPS itself is lost. A report from NIST [235] shows that most
current IDPSs are not capable of keeping up with high loads, or even moderate loads in
some cases. The above points suggest the need for an IDPS to react to the changes in
operating conditions and adjust itself in order to achieve the maximum benefit.
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1.2.3 Performance Prediction and QoS Requirements
An IDPS may be able to efficiently detect and prevent attacks which can compromise net-
work performance, however this often comes at a significant increase in processing delays
as the attack signature database grows. Also, the IDPS may be unable to cope with in-
creases in the amount of traffic due to limited resources in terms of CPU and memory. This
can lead to an increase in queue length, resulting in longer waiting times for packets, and
eventually packet losses. In this case, the IDPS itself becomes the network bottleneck. As
a result, operators of IDPS face significant challenges in determining how to best configure
and provision their systems. To do so, they need to understand and predict the resources
consumption of such systems. Analyzing the performance of the IDPS in terms of resource
consumption for different configurations and under different traffic characteristics allows
the prediction of the impact on network operation, and is therefore valuable for achieving
the best tradeoff between security objectives and QoS requirements.
1.3 Proposed Research Problems for Dissertation
In this dissertation, we provide an overview of existing IDPS designs and analyze their
strengths and common weaknesses. We identify several key desired properties of IDPSs
and propose a generalized framework which incorporates these properties for effective and
manageable IDPSs. We also shed light on the significance of IDPS’s performance using a
quantitative approach in terms of the average service time under various conditions. Par-
ticularly, the execution time of rule-checking process in IDPS is re-examined in this work.
6
We also analyze the performance of the IDPS in terms of resource consumption for different
configurations and under different traffic characteristics, which can help in predicting the
impact on network operations. We then leverage the above analysis to provide mathemat-
ical derivations for key performance metrics, namely: throughput, queuing delay, system
utilization, and packet loss at the IDPS level. Finally, based on our previous findings, we
investigate cloud-based provisioning of IDPS as service. In summary, we identify five open
problems significant enough to form the basis of my dissertation, which include: (i) policy-
based adaptation for IDPS , (ii) performance analysis in IDPS, (iii) IDPS configuration
management tradeoffs, (iv) queuing analysis in IDPS, and (iiv) elasticity of cloud-based
IDPSs.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follow. In Chapter 2, we provide an
overview of intrusion detection and prevention systems, their configuration management,
and existing adaptive IDPS solutions finishing this chapter with a summary of related work
in IDPS area. In Chapter 3 we propose a security configuration management framework
for IDPSs. In Chapter 4, we develop a new analytical model to investigate the relationship
between the IDPS performance and its configuration. Chapter 5 analyzes the impact of
security enforcement levels on the performance and usability of the network. Chapter 6
aims to analyze the performance of the IDPS under different traffic characteristics. In
Chapter 7 we introduce Elastic Virtual IDPS (v IDPS ) problem and propose an efficient
solution called Simple Lazy Facility Location (SLFL) to solve it. Finally, we draw our
conclusions and potential future work in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring and analyzing network traffic or computer
activities for signs of possible malicious incidents, such as malware (e.g., worms, spyware) or
unauthorized access or misused privileges that violate computer/network security policies.
The intrusion prevention process works similar to that of detection, but with the additional
function of stopping threatening incidents.
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a software/hardware system designed to au-
tomate the intrusion detection process. It inspects the events occurring in a computer
system or network for any suspicious activities. An IDS is designed to report intrusions
that violate the system security policy to a security administrator, who could quickly act
to minimize the damage caused by the intrusion. An Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS),
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however, has all the capabilities of an intrusion detection system plus the additional ability
to stop potential attacks. In comparison with an IDS, an IPS can respond to a detected
attack and prevent it from succeeding. The prevention can be done in many ways, such as
filtering the malicious traffic using a firewall or terminating the network connection or user
session that is involved in the attack. IDS and IPS technologies offer many of the same
capabilities, and administrators can usually disable prevention features in IPS products,
causing them to function as IDSs. Accordingly, for brevity the term ”Intrusion Detection
and Prevention Systems” (IDPS) is used throughout the rest of this thesis to refer to both
IDS and IPS technologies. Any exceptions to that are specifically noted.
2.1.1 Types of IDPSs
Based on the data monitored, IDPSs can be host-based or network-based. A host-based
IDPS (HIDPS) runs on an individual host or device in the network. It monitors in-
bound/outbound traffic to/from a computer as well as internal activities such as system
calls and system logs. A HIDPS can only monitor an individual host and may not have
a global view of the network activities. Some examples of HIDPSs are OSSEC [153] and
Tripwire [170]. Network-based IDPSs (NIDPS) monitor the traffic to/from the network.
A NIDPS contains sensors to sniff packets, and a data analyzer to process and correlate
data. Alarms are raised whenever suspected intrusions are found. However, a NIDPS does
not have knowledge about the internal activities of individual computers. Examples of
NIDPSs are Snort [230] and Bro [223].
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2.1.2 Detection Methodologies
IDPSs can be categorized into signature-based and anomaly-based, depending on the de-
tection technique. Signature-based IDPSs compare data packets with the signatures or
attributes of known intrusions in the database to decide whether the observed traffic is
malicious or not. A signature-based IDPS is efficient in detecting known intrusions with
fixed signatures. However, it is not efficient for detecting unknown intrusions or intru-
sions with polymorphic signatures. Pattern matching algorithms are in the heart of many
IDPSs’ signature-matching engines, as they determine the process of looking for specific
patterns in network traffic. Pattern matching algorithms can be classified into single- and
multi-pattern algorithms. In single-pattern matching algorithms, each pattern is searched
in a given text individually. Knuth-Morris-Pratt [175] and Boyer-Moore [64] are some of
the most widely used single pattern matching algorithms. Multi-pattern string matching
algorithms search for a set of patterns in a body of text simultaneously. This is achieved
by preprocessing the set of patterns and building an automaton that will be used in the
matching phase to scan the text. Multi-pattern matching scales much better than algo-
rithms that search for each pattern individually. Multi-pattern string matching algorithms
include Aho-Corasick [21], Wu-Manber [292] and Commentz-Walter [88].
Many research studies have focused on accelerating the pattern-matching process for
high-speed IDPSs (e.g., [188, 202]). The approaches to acceleration involve designing effi-
cient pattern-matching algorithms [33,217] , leveraging hardware implementation [40,179,
193, 202], and program parallelization [222]. The interest in this issue persists in the re-
search community of intrusion detection even until recently [146,171,178,187,270]. Many
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existing solutions can accelerate the matching with flexible patterns such as regular expres-
sions, achieving a linear time complexity even in the worst case. Given their excellent per-
formance achieving up to multi-gigabit per second, the bottleneck due to pattern-matching
seems to have been well addressed.
On the other hand, anomaly-based IDPSs observe traffic or computer activity and de-
tect intrusions by identifying activities distinct from a user’s or a system’s normal behavior.
Anomaly-based detection can detect unknown or new intrusions. However, it usually suffers
from a high false positive rate problem. One example of anomaly-based implementations
is the use of data mining algorithms to extract and identify valid, novel, and useful pat-
terns in audit data. Several data mining algorithms have been used for anomaly-based
IDPS including support vector machines [67,169], genetic algorithms [66,186], neural net-
works [211,278], and clustering [135,207,212], all of which improve the detection accuracy
of IDPS and assist in detecting new attacks.
2.2 IDPS Security Configuration Management
A set of parameters defines the configuration of an IDPS. The settings of these parameters
at any instance of time influence the IDPS’s detection capabilities as well as its performance
characteristics. The issue of IDPS configuration management has always been difficult to
deal with, mainly due to the overwhelming number of parameters to tune.
Signatures and Coverage: Signature-based IDPSs compare patterns against ob-
served events to identify possible incidents. Each input (packet, event, flow, etc.) is com-
11
pared against thousands of signatures in a more-or-less brute-force manner. Signatures
in most cases are written precisely to handle vulnerabilities, exploits, and other unknown
bad sequences. However, poorly written signatures can lead to false positive detection
where legitimate traffic mistakenly matches the attack signatures [91]. In an IDPS, each
signature is defined by a rule that describes a known intrusion threat. A rule can be either
a detective or a preventive rule. The detective rule aims to inspect a copy of a packet
transmitted over the network and generate an alert when a malicious pattern exists in the
packet header and/or content. Unlike the detective rule, the preventive rule is configured
to be in-line so that traffic will be dropped if it carries a malicious pattern that matches
the rule.
The IDPS coverage can be determined by the number of rules. The security adminis-
trator is responsible for including and excluding rules according to the specific needs of the
protected network environment. For instance, Snort allows the enabling/disabling of rule
libraries or individual rules through a set of configuration files. Furthermore, the security
administrator can specify the mode of the rules as either detective or preventive mode.
2.2.1 Performance Analysis
The performance of IDPSs has attracted much attention in the past decade, especially with
the ever-increasing volume of Internet traffic. If an IDPS is not efficient enough to keep up
with the network speed, it results in dropping packets and consequently missing intrusions.
Worse yet, if the system operates in a preventive mode (in-line), it will impose a direct
limitation on the performance of an operational network notably by delaying the traffic.
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A wide range of studies has been conducted to tackle the issues of IDPS performance,
including modeling the performance, speeding up the deep packet inspection, adapting
the configurations at the run-time system operations, and characterizing the operational
performance with real traffic. In the following, we review some of the components that are
important in characterizing and enhancing the performance of an IDPS.
2.2.2 Dynamic Adaptation and Re-configuration
Traditional intrusion detection and prevention systems rely heavily on the extensive knowl-
edge of security experts about the networked system to be protected. However, today’s
networks are highly dynamic due to the frequent changes in the software/hardware deployed
in the environment. Furthermore, security threats are constantly evolving and becoming
more sophisticated. Current real-time IDPSs are statically configured and do not have the
ability to adapt their configurations and workload at run-time, depending on the changing
operational conditions [263]. Therefore, as operating conditions change due to fluctuation
in the traffic profile or when under an overload attack, the original configuration becomes a
non-optimal one and reduces the value of the IDPS. Performance adaptations via dynamic
reconfiguration are necessary for an IDPS to counter such attacks. We argue that IDPS
reconfigurability and performance adaptation must be considered not only during IDPS
design and implementation, but also during IDPS operation after its deployment. Indeed,
an IDPS should accomplish performance adaptation by optimizing its configuration at
run-time.
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2.3 Related Work
In this section, we will discuss the works from the literature that are closely related to each
of the contributions of this thesis.
2.3.1 Policy-based Dynamic Adaptation
Using policies to drive security management has been extensively studied in the past [63].
However, existing work did not address the problem from the point of view of dynamic
adaptation for the sake of balancing system performance and security.
The authors of [82] sought to transform an IDS system into an IPS by proposing a
policy management for firewall devices integrated with intrusion prevention capabilities.
They proposed an attack response matrix model which maps intrusion types to traffic
enforcement actions. Their proposal is, however, only at the design level, and no concrete
implementation or policy specifications have been provided. In addition, the authors do
not consider trading off security enforcement levels and system performance but only how
to transform an IDS into an IPS using policies.
Various proposals by Carver et al. [71–73] focused on dynamic mapping through an
agent architecture (AAIRS). In this system, a host is monitored by multiple IDSs, and
alarms are generated as needed. These alarms are first evaluated by the Master Analysis
agent, which then notes the level of confidence of the attack and sends it to an Analy-
sis agent, which then produces a tailored plan of response for the attack. Based on the
same concern of capturing and modeling of security requirements, Albuquerque et al. pro-
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posed policy-based management framework to automatically derive security configuration
for enterprise networks [98]. Their proposal tackles the issue during the design stage of
security configuration. However, coping with ongoing changes during operation time is not
considered in this proposal.
The researchers in [128] put forward a management tool called MIRAGE to analyze,
refine, and automatically deploy configuration settings related to network layers (i.e., VPN
routers or firewalls ). Their approach does not, however, cover security requirements’ de-
sign phase. As well, updates of the components’ configurations are not managed when
comparing any discrepancies between the actual and the desired configurations. An in-
teresting approach was proposed by Hassan [152] for the refinement of network security
policies with regard to the low level security mechanisms. The model is policy-based in
automating security mechanism implementation, and assesses the balance between the
high-level security policy and the corresponding low-level security mechanism. While the
approach focuses on full automation, no guidance is provided to check ambiguities and
resolve any policy conflicts.
A system was proposed by Saleh et al. [234] to use a signature-based approach for
attack detection, with prevention done by a packet-filtering firewall. The system utilized
the Snort Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS), which provides alerts on attack
detection and forwards the alerts from NIDS to the firewall, which uses XML to form the
incoming and outgoing network traffic rules. The proposed technique was suggested by the
authors to be the most effective when the servers are placed in a ”Demilitarized Zone”.
The proposed system’s advantage is that it works when the attack signatures are already
known, but it is unable to detect attacks whose signatures are unknown, and so the system
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administrator must analyze any alerts sent by the NIDS. It is also prone to high rates of
false positives and negatives, although it can be improved by modifying it to detect novel
attacks [234].
A cost-sensitive model was proposed by Lee et al. [181] based on three factors: 1)
operational cost, i.e., cost of processing; 2) damage cost, i.e., cost of damage when the IDS
fails to work properly; and 3) response cost, , i.e., cost to apply the response to an attack.
A cost-sensitive and response cost model were also proposed by Balepin et al. (2003), who
provided a model to evaluate responses based on local resource dependency. Their method
was to evaluate the system state in order to compute the cost of response. They found it
difficult to produce a model that noted each resource’s value, so resources were ranked by
importance and high priority resources were allocated static costs.
In [259], Tanachaiwiwat et al. proposed a method to represent the reports of different
IDSs into a matrix. These metrics give the number of triggered alarms depending on the
attack, but also the number of false positives. This is followed by a risk assessment stage,
where the possible cost of an attack and of the corresponding countermeasure is derived.
Teo and Ahn [261] proposed a policy framework called Chameleos-x designed to enforce
security policies on different kinds of equipment. Chameleos-x has three major components
including a Management Console, a Translator, and Enforcement Monitors. The Manage-
ment Console is used to send policies to the Enforcement Monitors that are located on each
host. The Enforcement Monitors invoke the Translator to adapt the received policies into
a system-specific ones which are then executed. However, their proposal lacks the support
for explicit modeling of the network architecture, therefore it is difficult to understand the
coverage and the applicability of the policies in different environments.
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Finally, a business perspective to configuration management was provided as part of
the Power prototype [74]. The latter supports the creation of policy hierarchies by means
of a tool-assisted policy refinement, but the syntax used is a Prolog-like language, far
from both business and administrators’ views. The framework developed in the scope of
the Positif project [47] provides an initial method to integrate policy specifications and
anomaly detection systems (such as IDS) through policy-driven configuration of security
services of networked systems within a single administrative domain. The desired behavior
of the information security system (i.e., the IDS) can be implicitly achieved by means of
policy specification. However, their proposal has not been implemented into a real system.
2.3.2 Performance Analysis and Optimization
The performance analysis of an IDPS involves many issues that go beyond the IDPS itself.
Hardware platform, operating system, or ever the configuration setup of the IDPS are
examples of such issues. However, the most important performance metric of an IDPS is
to measure the systems ability to process traffic at high speed with minimum packet loss
while working in real-time. Recent studies show that the IDPS rule checking process is a
performance bottleneck where over 70% of the total CPU processing time of modern IDPSs
is consumed by this process [69, 106, 107, 238, 287]. Accordingly, researchers have focused
on devising solutions and algorithms, either software- or hardware-based, to improve the
performance of this process. However, there has been little research on the issue of dynamic
adaptation to balance system performance and security.
Significant efforts have been made in the past to improve the performance of the IDPS.
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Schaelicke et al. [236] propose a methodology to measure the performance of rule-based
IDPSs. They performed measurements for different packet payload sizes on a 100Mbit link,
which was nearly saturated during the evaluation. The number of rules kept increasing
until packet loss was reported, the maximum number of supported rules was then used as an
indicator of performance. Furthermore, their study showed that the hardware platform,
system parameters (i.e., memory and CPU), and the operating system are important
factors for improving the performance of IDPSs. In [107], authors present a model for
monitoring the resource usage of IDPSs, and then predicting their resource consumption.
Their goal is to fine tune the security level based on resource consumption. This work
is clearly helpful to IDPSs operators in determining suitable security configurations and
is closely related to ours. However, our investigations go a step further by analyzing the
impact of IDPS configuration on average service time.
Lee et al. [180] propose a technique to measure the performance of an IDS by quantifying
the benefits and costs of detection rules. Their goal is to dynamically determine the optimal
configuration for an overloaded IDS to prevent data dropping under resource constraint
and to trigger adaptation to current conditions. Their work is similar to ours in that it
measures the expected service time of different IDS configuration sets to determine the
optimal one. However, defining the cost and benefit metrics precisely is not an easy task
and varies from one environment to another. Furthermore, considering the preventive
capability of an IDPS, the analysis presented by Lee et al. seems inadequate. This is
due to violation of the strict QoS requirement in terms of end-to-end delay caused by the
prevention process.
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2.3.3 Markovian based Queuing Analysis Model
Few studies have utilized mathematical models to analyze IDPS performance in different
configurations. Most of these used queuing theory to model DDoS attacks and counter
these attacks by devoting resources, regardless of how effective the detection and subse-
quent filtering algorithms are [50,194,283]. Resource demands and QoS were usually only
estimated for benign users in a DDoS battle in these models. Yu et. al. [296] defined a
queueing model DDoS attack mitigation in cloud environments. Their focus was to allocate
necessary resources to the IDPS automatically and dynamically when a cloud-hosted server
comes under DDoS attack. Similarly, Chang [75] considered a simple queueing model for a
SYN flooding attack, which is a very common DoS attack. The impact of DoS attacks was
analyzed by Khan and Traore [167] on three parameters used for attack detection: response
time, queue-growth-rate, and arrival rate. Two queueing models were proposed by Long et
al. [191] for the DoS attacks in order to measure packet loss probability, packet delay, and
jitter. A generalized multi-class Erlang and Engset mixed-loss model was used by Huang
et al. [159] to analyze a network under DDoS attacks, and the model was later extended
to analyze 3G wireless cellular networks [160]. Different from the studies found in the lit-
erature, our work uses a more general queuing model with an embedded two-dimensional
Markov chain, which more accurately captures the actual dynamics of DoS attacks.
The impact of an IDPS on network performance has received far less attention. Set-
ting configuration parameters appropriately for the IDPS to ensure detection/prevention
accuracy while avoiding negative impact on the quality of service is still a challenging prob-
lem. Hess et al. [158] tried to mitigate the impact of IPS services on the end-to-end delay.
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They proposed an architecture consisting of an overlay network of IPSs implemented on
programmable routers. However, such an architecture cannot be easily deployed, as it re-
quires router programmability, which is not a common feature in commercial off-the-shelf
routers. Dreger et al. studied the trade-off between security level and resource consump-
tion [106, 107], while Lee et al. [180] put forward a method to determine the performance
of an IDPS by quantifying the benefits and drawbacks of each detection rule. In order
to reach the best possible configuration for an overloaded IDS, they proposed a heuristic-
based algorithm. However, they did not rely on any analytical model, and thus it is hard
to predict in advance the resulting performance for a given configuration.
In the area of firewalls, Salah et al. [233] derived an analytical queuing model based
on an embedded Markov chain in order to analyze the performance of rule-based firewalls.
As well, they provided closed-form expressions for a number of significant performance
metrics, such as CPU utilization, service time, and mean throughput. Similar to our work,
they assumed that the arrival rate follows a Poisson distribution and the service times are
independent and exponentially distributed. However, their model cannot be utilised in the
IDPS context because it has different processing stages compared to firewalls.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing works has proposed queuing-based
modeling for IDPS systems that involve both header and content analysis stages. We
develop an embedded Markov chain model, making the setting of the IDPS configura-
tion possible analytically. Accordingly, the security administrator is able to select the
appropriate configuration that achieves the desired trade-off between security and network
performance.
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2.3.4 Elastic Cloud-based IDPS Provisioning
Many mechanisms have been proposed to support elasticity through horizontal scaling,
vertical scaling, and migration techniques [127].
Horizontal Scaling : Amazon Auto Scaling Group [244] offers tenant controlled hori-
zontal scaling based on tenant-defined thresholds. Microsoft Azure [5] adapts the number
of instances based on time, history, or size of workload. Clayman et al. [86] focus on
dynamic virtual nodes placement to satisfy increasing demand by installing new virtual
routers; however, no mechanism to release resources is supported. Stratos [130] uses a
simple packing technique to elastically scale resources.
Vertical Scaling : CloudScale [247] and PRESS [138] scale by releasing or allocating
CPU resources while ignoring network resources. Vertical scaling mechanisms are limited
to individual physical machines [239]. Furthermore, changing compute or memory resources
on-the-fly is not supported in most cases. In addition, vertical scaling requires rebooting
the system causing potential SLA violations. Therefore, Cloud Providers (CPs) do not
encourage vertical scaling mechanisms.
Migration: Migration is a popular technique to achieve elastic VM placement and
server and network consolidation. pMapper [274] considers VM migration cost in its greedy
heuristics to solve the optimal VM placement problem. Entropy [157] models the optimal
VM placement as a variant of the vector bin-packing. However, both pMapper and En-
tropy ignore bandwidth requirement and locality in placement decisions. Kingfisher [246]
employs both vertical and horizontal elasticity mechanisms by allocating more host re-
sources, installing and migrating VM instances. It optimizes host resources from tenants’
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standpoint while also considering the overhead (in terms of delay) introduced by these
mechanisms. Here again, network resources such as bandwidth are also ignored.
MCRVMP [56] addresses the static VM placement problem to satisfy time-varying
traffic demands of the VMs in addition to CPU and memory requirements. TVMPP [204]
strives to reduce the aggregate traffic. However, it can lead to placement solutions with
congested links, since it does not consider link capacity constraints. The authors of NAVP
[196] focus on consolidating as much traffic demands as possible over the same set of
network links in order to reduce the total energy consumption.
Recently, Bouet et al. [62] studied the placement of virtual Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI) engines to optimize both the number of installed engines and their network footprint.
However, the formulated problem is static and cannot handle elastic IDPS placement.
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Chapter 3
AdapSec: Adaptive Security
Management Framework
3.1 Introduction
Security configuration management is the task performed by network administrators to
adequately configure security tools such as IDPSs in order to ensure enterprise network
security and lower the risk of security breaches. In Chapter 2, we surveyed a number of
existing IDPS security configuration management techniques that aim to provide solutions
that lower the cost of configuration management, enhance efficiency and improve reliabil-
ity. However, most of the previous studies focused either on improving the security of the
enterprise regardless of the impact of its performance and productivity or vice versa. Only
few studies addressed the tradeoffs between network security and performance. In this
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chapter we propose an Adaptive Security management framework (AdapSec) for intrusion
detection and prevention systems. The main goal of this framework is to provide configura-
tion tools that dynamically adjust the parameters of the IDPS according to the high level
objectives specified by the security administrator. It also includes tools that continuously
monitor the performance of the security system and assist the administrator in taking de-
cision regarding the security and performance. The security administrator has always to
evaluate security risks and interact with the AdapSec to provide high level objectives in
terms of security and performance. He can also increase and decrease the priority of some
rules according to his assessment of vulnerabilities and threats.
We also highlight the need for and present a policy-based approach for the configu-
ration and control of the security enforcement mechanisms of an enterprise information
system. The approach relies on dynamic adaptation of security measures, based on the
assessment of system vulnerability and threat prediction, and provides several levels of
attack containment. The use of policy-based dynamic adaptation approach in IDPSs not
only effectively improve the detection accuracy of the IDPS, it also preserve a good system
performance and utilization. Our proposal is practically viable and can be used to assist
security analysts to operate IDPS in more dynamic and adaptive way.
In evaluating the effectiveness of our policy-based adaptation approach, we have con-
ducted comprehensive experiments based on a real implementation. More specifically,
we have implemented a dynamic policy-based adaptation mechanism between the Snort
signature-based IDPS and the lightweight anomaly-based FireCol IDS [29, 124]. We per-
formed our experiments using the DARPA 2000 and 1999 intrusion detection evaluation
datasets to show the viability of our approach. Our experimental results demonstrate how
24
good attack detection is feasible with a low resource overhead when the right set of rule
categories and configuration parameters are enabled. The performance gains in terms of
resource utilization as well as the ability to detect security threats and respond to them at
the right time provided a proof of concept at least for the FireCol/Snort adaptation use
case.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We proceed with describing our
intrusion detection and prevention system and its security control system in Section 3.2
and 3.3 respectively. The policy-based security management design is presented in Section
3.4. In section 3.5, our FireCol anomaly-based IDS is described. Section 3.6 presents the
experiments we have conducted using dynamic adaptation policies, FireCol, and Snort.
Section 3.7 discusses the challenges related to policy-based security adaptation. Finally
section 3.8 concludes Chapter with a discussion of future work.
3.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention System
AdapSec has two major components, namely the security control system and the intrusion
detection and prevention system. As shown in Figure 3.1, the intrusion detection and
prevention system includes four components:
• Monitoring module is responsible for gathering statistics about (1) the incom-
ing traffic (e.g., arrival rate, packet headers), (2) the IDPS performance (e.g., packet
analysis time, packet drop rate, outgoing throughput) and (3) the IDPS resource con-
sumption (e.g., CPU and memory). The collected information are then transferred
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Figure 3.1: AdapSec architecture design
to the security control system for further analysis.
• IDPS rule set is the most critical component in IDPS which mostly define its
configuration. A rule-set database contains a variety of pre-defined patterns that are
matched against incoming packets for possible malicious contents. Two types of rules
are considered, namely: detective and preventive rules. Detective rules are checked
oﬄine by the intrusion detection module whereas the preventive rules are checked
inline by the intrusion prevention module.
• Intrusion prevention module is in charge of identifying and blocking anomalous
traffic. The IPS operates inline where all traffic has to be queued and analyzed.
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The intrusion prevention module drops traffic that is recognized as malicious by the
preventive rules.
• Intrusion detection module receives copy of all packets in order to inspect them to
detect suspicious activities that match the detection rules. It then reports detected
intrusions to the security control system in order to evaluate the severity of the
rule that has triggered the alert. The security control system can eventually then
reclassify this rule as preventive.
3.3 Security Control System
The security control system is in charge of storing statistics and logs reported by the IDPS,
analyzing them and adjusting the configuration of the IDPS according to the required
objectives not only in terms of security but also in terms of performance as well. It mainly
consists of four components:
• Knowledge repository stores the statistics collected from the monitoring module
or provided by the performance analysis module.
• Performance analysis module provides models and tools used to analyze the per-
formance of a particular IDPS configuration. For instance, we include in this module
a new probabilistic model to evaluate the relationship between the IDPS configura-
tion and its performance (i.e., the average service time per packet). We also develop
an analytical model based on embedded Markov chains, which allows to predict the
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impact of the configuration on network performance (e.g., the throughput, queuing
delay, system utilization, and packet loss caused by IDPS). Such a model can help
the security administrator to find the right trade-off between security enforcement
levels and Quality of Service (QoS) requirements.
• Adaptive Rule Management Module is in charge of adapting the IDPS configu-
ration based on runtime statistics collected by the monitoring module and analyzed
by the performance analysis module. This module mainly selects which rule is pre-
ventive and which rule is detective. Rules in detective mode have no impact on the
network performance (e.g., delay) as they are checked separately and oﬄine by the
intrusion detection module using a copy of the traffic. Prevention rules are checked
inline by the intrusion prevention module and hence may impact the network perfor-
mance, (e.g., a high processing delay can result in a high packet delay). We propose a
rule mode selection optimization technique that determines an appropriate IDPS con-
figuration set in order to maximize the security enforcement levels while minimizing
network performance degradation.
• Alert management module receives reports from IDPS system about detected and
prevented events. Security administrator then analyzes these reports for drawing a
conclusion about the accuracy and performance of the IDPS.
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Figure 3.2: Policy-based Dynamic Adaptation Module
3.4 Policy-based Dynamic Adaptation
The policy-based security management design we propose is part of the adaptive rule man-
agement module presented in the previous section. It uses system administrator policies to
balance the security measures employed by the enterprise information system. As depicted
in Figure 3.2, the adaptive management of the enterprise security is provided at the low
level through the repository of risk management policies. This repository is maintained
by the security administrator(s) based on previous experince as well as the input from
deployed threat prediction tools.
Threat prediction tools assess the degree of vulnerability of the enterprise system with
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regard to a range of potential attacks. They gather information from external threat eval-
uation sources and generate reports on the risks that are likely to threaten the information
system in the near future. Threat evaluation sources can be of different kinds, internal and
external. Honeypots [225] represent an effective means to detect and learn about security
threats. Statistical reports and peer security alerts from trusted parties represent another
valuable source of information. For instance, in this work we use FireCol [125] as an alert
source for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. The FireCol system forms rings
of protection around a subscribed customer and lies outside the premises of the enterprise
network.
The overall assessment of the system security and potential forthcoming threats is
translated into risk management policies (Figure 3.2). These policies adapt the behavior
of the underlying security measures accordingly. The translation is done by the threat
assessment and security policy decision component. As it is not trivial to automatically
assess and decide which security policy to enforce, human administrators are expected to
be involved in this process.
The underlying security enforcement system comprises all those measures, tools, and
devices that collectively participate in implementing the overall security policy. This in-
cludes the dynamic (re)configuration of host-based and network-based intrusion detection
and prevention systems (IDPSes), firewalls, proxies, application server security compo-
nents, activity reporting and event analysis components, etc.
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Figure 3.3: Sample Simulation Topology of FireCol
3.5 Threats Prediction and Assessment
3.5.1 Description
We adapted FireCol [125] in our security management framework to enable it to detect
the majority of the attacks with low false positive detection rates. The FireCol system
aims to detect DDoS attacks as far as possible from the victim and as close as possible
to the attack source. It can be used both as an IDS or IPS. As depicted in Figure 3.3,
FireCol instances can be distributed over ISP routers forming rings of protection around
the customer.
A list of n rules R1, R2, ...Rn describing packet patterns is input to FireCol. After
that, simple metrics related to rule-matching are maintained. One metric is related to the
frequency fi of the matching of rules Ri (Eq. 3.1) during a predefined detection window
dw. It is computed by dividing the number of packets matching this rule Fi by the total
number of packets.
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Another metric is the entropy (Eq. 3.2) which is an indicator of the diversity of traffic.
For instance, the entropy is 1 when the distribution is uniform.
The last metric is the relative entropy metric (Eq. 3.4) which permits to compare easily
if the current distribution f is close to the profile f ′ (higher than a certain threshold ω).
In the first step of the detection mechanism, FireCol determines whether the traffic has
changed before continuing, otherwise it indicates that there is no attack because it would
have been detected before. Therefore, the detection process continues only if the relative
entropy is higher than a threshold ω.
fi =
Fi∑n
j=1 Fj
(3.1)
H = −E[logfi] = −
n∑
i=1
f(i)logn(fi) , (entropy) (3.2)
ψi = log
fi
f ′i
(3.3)
K(f, f ′) =
n∑
i=1
fi ψi , (relative entropy) (3.4)
fi(t)
fi(profile)
> 1 + γ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, fi(t) >  (3.5)
Scorei = fi × bk , (confidence score) (3.6)
Based on the use of the decision table 3.1, a confidence score for each pre-selected rule
is derived (Eqs. 3.5, 3.6.) Basically, a high frequency means a possible DDoS attack.
However, this detection approach cannot be used because the frequency of rules depend on
each other. Thus FireCol considers the entropy for describing the randomness or diversity
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Table 3.1: FireCol decision table
Case Entropy Frequency Conclusion Score factor
1 High High Potential b1
2 Low High Medium threat b2
3 High Low Potential later b3
4 Low Low No potential b4 = 0
of a selected set of features of traffic. More detail about the decision table are given in [125].
After that, the current score, the previous score affected by an ageing factor a, and the
score from upstream FireCol instances are combined in order to obtain the effective score
of a rule. If the score is higher than a certain threshold τ , a horizontal communication
(Figure 3.3) between the FireCol instances on the ring structure is launched to compute
the overall data rate and compare it with the capacity of the client. Otherwise, the decision
is delegated by sending the score to the next upstream FireCol instance and so on [125].
Here we did not consider a ring architecture and we used FireCol on a single host instead.
3.5.2 Complexity
Although FireCol implements many stages during the detection process, the operations
are simple. For example, we can compute the worst case complexity (all stages are needed)
as follow. Considering that the frequency and entropy are computed only at the end of
the detection window dw, FireCol has just to count the number of packets for each rule.
Assuming pdw is the number of packets during dw, there are pdw operations to increment
the counter. To compute the frequencies at the end, FireCol has to sum all counters (i.e.,
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n operations where n is the number of rules.) Then we have the following steps:
• Compute the frequency of each rule (Eq. 3.1): n operations
• Compute the entropy (Eq. 3.2): 2n operations
• Compute the relative entropy (Eq. 3.4): 2n operations + 1 comparison
• Extract suspect n2 rules (Eq. 3.5): 1 operation
• Examine extracted rules (Table 3.1): n2 + 1
• Compute the score for the case 1,2,3 of the decision table (n3 rules) (Eq. 3.6): n3
operations
• Compute the confidence level: 2n3 operations
The main question is about the values of n2 and n3. We have n ≥ n2 ≥ n3 because
few rules are kept at each stage for further analysis. It can be formalized by using an
exponential distribution i.e., n2 = n × p( fi(t)fi(profile) > 1 + γ) = e−λ(1+γ) where γ is the
parameter of the exponential law. Similarly, n3 can be calculated. As a result, FireCol has
O(n) complexity even if all the rules are selected i.e., n = n2 = n3.
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3.6 Performance Evaluation
3.6.1 Experimental Settings
In order to test the validity of policy-based adaptation of security configuration while
keeping the use case simple, we focus on DDoS attacks and define adaptation policies that
help adapt Snort security level based on alert inputs from the FireCol and from Snort
itself. The policies are described in Table 3.2.
Snorts rules (signatures) are organized into classes. Each class contains a number of
rules that are related to a known attack type. For example, the FTP class contains all
rules related to attacks on FTP servers. Snort allows the enabling/disabling of rule classes
(categories) or individual rules through a set of configuration files. Snort (v 2.8.6) has a
set of 58 categories.
For the sake of our experiments, we defined three levels of detection capability for Snort.
The medium detection level contains rules that are enabled by default when deploying
Snort. The total number of rules in this detection level is 8722 categorized into 32 libraries.
The minimum detection level is defined by choosing the minimal set of rules that detect
essential attack types. This level includes 11 libraries containing 4152 rules. The third
level of detection is the maximum level, which includes all the libraries and has 9205 rules
categorized into 51 libraries. As it is not trivial, section 3.7 elaborates on the issue of
choosing the appropriate set of categories for each detection level.
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3.6.2 Scenarios and Policies Modeling
We conduct experiments using different Snort detection capabilities to scan the DARPA
2000 LLDoS 1.0 [177] and 1999 [189] datasets, which last for three hours and one week
respectively. As predicted in [28], relying only on a single instance of FireCol may entail
many false alerts. In this experiment we use Snort as a means to confirm the validity of a
FireCol alert. In our case, FireCol is deployed at a single location close to the victim.
We introduce in this study a confidence level between zero and one associated to each
FireCol alert. The maximal score of a FireCol alert is the maximal frequency multiplied
by the maximal factor b1. When the detection is triggered, this maximal score is affected
by the ageing factor a. So we obtain:
maxscore = maxfrequency × b1 × a (3.7)
Considering the most aggressive attack with a constant frequency of 1 during all detec-
tion windows, the maximal possible score is:
maxscore(0) = b1 (3.8)
maxscore(i) = (maxscore(i− 1)× a) + b1 (3.9)
When i tends to ∞, this term tends to
m =
b1
1− a (3.10)
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Table 3.2: Policies for Dynamic Detection Capabilities
Hence, the confidence level of the score s is:
confidence =
s− τ
m− τ (3.11)
The dynamic security-level adaptation policies are listed in Table 3.2. For the purpose
of this evaluation, the inputs to them are alerts from either the FireCol or Snort. Whenever
the FireCol generates an alert with high confidence (> 60%), Snort detection is upgraded
by two levels (policy p2). If the FireCol generates an alert with a medium confidence
(> 40%), the detection level of Snort is increased by one level (policy p1). Low confidence
FireCol alerts are ignored (≤ 40%). For Snort, we only consider high-priority alerts by
augmenting the detection level by one (policy p3). Furthermore, we define a caution window
cw for the medium and maximum detection levels. This window represents the period
where Snort should stay in a particular detection level before it switches down to a lower
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Figure 3.4: Snort performance over multiple datasets using different Detection Levels
level in case no abnormal behavior has been observed (policy p4).
3.6.3 Detection levels and Cost
Figure 3.4 represents the running time of Snort with three different detection levels (mini-
mum, medium, and maximum) over a number of datasets. Each group of bars corresponds
to a particular dataset and each bar represents the detection level used in Snort to scan
the dataset. Although, the medium and maximum detection levels of Snort include nearly
the same number of rules (the medium level has 95% of all rules), Snort performance was
different for these levels. This is because the default-disabled rule sets are computationally
expensive and time consuming. Since these results are conducted by scanning the tcpdump
file of the datasets, Snort did not drop any packet due to unrestricted time limit. However,
this may not be the case in a real time environment with high-rate links (i.e. gigabit)
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Table 3.3: FireCol alerts for the DARPA 2000 dataset (dw = 60s)
where some packets may be dropped to keep up with the rate. Dropping packets has the
undesired outcome of the possibility of missing some attacks.
In the first experiment, we use the DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0 dataset [177] which con-
tains traffic collected from two sensors installed in the DMZ and the Inside parts of the
evaluation network. We focus our analysis on the inside sensor. The dataset features a
series of attacks carried out over multiple sessions. These sessions start with a scanning
the network in order to launch a DDOS attack against an off-site server. The sessions are
grouped into five phases. First, the attacker starts by scan of the network (IPsweep) look-
ing for any live IP addresses. Then, it looks for the sadmind daemon of live IP addresses.
The attacker exploits the sadmind vulnerability in order to install an mstream Trojan,
which is required for launching the DDoS attack. Finally, the DDoS attack is launched
against the off-site server if successful.
Using FireCol, and as shown in Table 3.3, the DDoS victim is identified to be 131.84.1.31.
39
Figure 3.5: Impact of Detection window size on the FireCol overhead. Time reduction
in seconds comparing with a 60 seconds detection window and number of mathematical
operations
In this experiment the FireCol was run with a detection window of one minute. The FireCol
manages to detect the attack with a relatively high confidence level (67%). There are some
other false positive alerts. However, most of them got filtered out using the 40-60% con-
fidence thresholds (policies p1 and p2) and only one false alert for host 172.16.113.105
remained. This alert may be due to a traffic burst to which the FireCol is sensitive.
The detection window size is an important parameter of FireCol. Large values imply
that some DDoS attacks will be detected too late, while small values result in increased
false positives due to traffic profile fluctuation. Figure 3.5 shows the time and overhead
in terms of number of operations induced by several detection window sizes for the same
dataset. In all cases however, the overhead induced by FireCol is much less than the one
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due to the execution of Snort because of the difference in detection mechanism. The delay
and the number of operations are greatly reduced because there are more detection time
slots. However, when the detection window size decreases, the traffic is more variable.
3.6.4 Detection Levels and Accuracy
This experiment shows how different risk management policies can significantly affect the
detection capabilities of Snort. It also shows the effectiveness of detecting some attacks
based on the prediction mechanism or on the assistance from other security components.
For example, if the security administrator is expecting the network to be under a DoS
attack, then Snort needs to be dynamically tuned for maximum DoS detection and so on.
The actual difficulties ahead are related to how to effectively predict the security risk and
be able to enforce the appropriate risk management policy into the relevant components
of the security enforcement components.
Figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 show the impact of dynamic security level adaptation policies
on the behavior of Snort when scanning the DARPA dataset with different caution and
detection window sizes.
Figure 3.6(a) shows the result for a caution window of cwm = 5 and cwx = 10 minutes
for the medium and maximum security levels respectively. The first alert that changed
the security level of Snort comes from FireCol at 09:57 with a confidence of 0.8 (policy
p2). It is worth noting that the first phase of the attacks (IPsweep) did not change Snort
detection level because the severity of all the alerts generated by Snort for this phase was
medium. However, for all the other attack phases, except the fourth phase which needs a
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(a) CW=5/10mn (b) CW=10/20mn
Figure 3.6: Snort Security Level Adaptation when DW=5s and Th=40-60% (DARPA 2000
dataset)
host-based IDS to be detected, Snort was in its maximum detection level. Overall, Snort
was running at maximum detection 28.66% of the time, at medium detection 13.16%. This
implies that it was running at minimum detection 58.17% of the time while it still managed
to detect the attack phases. In terms of the time necessary to analyze the dataset, Snort
took 28% less time than it did if ran at maximum detection. This is good if we know that
the DARPA 2000 dataset is only three hours long and contains a five phases attack.
Figure 3.6(b) represents the detection behavior of Snort with a large caution window of
10 minutes for the medium and 20 minutes for the maximum security levels. This results
in Snort running in maximum detection level since the occurrence of the first high-level
alert. This is because the high-level alerts coming either from Snort or FireCol make it so
that the cwx caution window never reaches an end.
In Figure 3.7(a), we use the same caution window size as in 3.6(a) but with a larger
window detection size. This results in having Snort run in maximum detection level in
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(a) (DW,CW,Th)=(10s,5/10mn,40-60%) (b) (DW,CW,Th)=(60s,3/5mn,0%)
Figure 3.7: Snort Security Level Adaptation when varying DW and Th (DARPA 2000
dataset)
only three of the four detectable attack phases. In Figure 3.7(b), we use smaller caution
windows and a large window detection size of one minute, which results in reducing the
overall time for the maximum and the medium detection levels and having Snort run at
medium detection and not maximum detection during the DDoS attack.
Finally, Figures 3.8(a) and 3.8(b) show the dynamic security levels when using the
DARPA 1999 dataset. The results are quite interesting as in the many DDoS attacks
occuring in this long dataset (one week), all those which last for more than around five
seconds manage to get captured by FireCol and hence reported to Snort which adapts its
security level accordingly.
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(a) (DW,CW,Th)=(60s,5/10mn,40-60%) (b) (DW,CW,Th)=(60s,10/20mn,40-60%)
Figure 3.8: Dynamic Snort Detection Level Adaptation for DARPA 1999 Dataset
3.7 Discussion
The promises of policy-based dynamic adaptation of a security system to reduce secu-
rity enforcement overhead while preserving good system performance are faced with the
problem of defining the appropriate configuration policies in order to avoid an excessive
exposure to real threats. In our experiments, configuration parameters, such as the cau-
tion windows of adaptation policies, the window detection size of the FireCol, and score
thresholds are not trivial to set. For the FireCol, reducing the detection window size helps
in the early detection of DDoS attacks but has the disadvantage of increased overhead and
number of false alerts. However, in all cases, the overhead due to FireCol is always much
lower than that entailed by Snort. In addition, depending on resource availability and
attack prediction, the confidence thresholds may be lowered or increased by the system
administrator. Using techniques such as neural networks or fuzzy logic, can be helpful in
solving this configuration problem.
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An additional concern which affects the accuracy of the detection is the selection of
categories (set of rules) for each detection level as well as the number/type of security
levels to define. The selection of categories may vary form an environment to another.
For instance, the maximum detection level for protecting the web server of a company
should include not only all the rules which detect web server specific attacks, but also
those related to potential preliminary steps of these attacks, such as scanning. A possible
solution for choosing the categories for each detection level can be based on common attack
graphs [214] where the early steps of the attacks are included in the minimum detection
level. However, the attacker may learn about the use of the caution window-based behavior
and artificially introduce delay between attack steps. This can be countered by using a
dynamic caution window size.
Another important point is related to the inherent support of dynamic adaptation by
existing security mechanisms and tools. In this work, Snort was a hurdle in the sense that
it does not yet support dynamic adaptation. We resorted to the use of virtual machines
or double Snorting. However, these techniques have the main disadvantage of loosing
detection state. The ideal solution would be to improve Snort source code to support the
dynamic loading and unloading of rules/categories without the loss of detection state.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented a policy-based design for adaptive risk management of an
enterprise information system. Our proposal is intended to provide policy-based dynamic
adaptation and reconfiguration mechanisms of the deployed levels of security measures.
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The policies allow to define and dynamically maintain the right balance between effective
security on one hand and system usability and performance on the other.
As a proof of concept, we carried out using dynamic adaptation experiments between
the light-weight anomaly-based FireCol IDS and the more advanced signature-based Snort
IDPS over known datasets. The experiments showed how good attack detection can still
be feasible along with a low resource overhead when the right set of rule categories and
configuration parameters are enabled. The performance gains in terms of resource utiliza-
tion as well as the ability to detect security threats and respond to them at the right time
validate our approach at least for the FireCol/Snort adaptation use case. Future work
will investigate of attack graphs, attack statistical relationships, and learning mechanisms
to define appropriate adaptation policies and security levels, and conduct experiments on
other IDPS systems such as Bro.
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Chapter 4
Configuration and Performance
Analysis
4.1 Introduction
One of the major requirements for deploying any security technology is the ability to de-
fend against attacks. Another requirement is to avoid network performance degradation
when maximum security is not necessary. This results in a trade-off between security
enforcement levels on one side and the performance and usability of an enterprise informa-
tion system on the other. Existing IDPSs do not take into account these two conflicting
goals. Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) inspect copies of the packets
that are transmitted over the network and generate alerts whenever malicious content is
found. In contrast, Network-based Intrusion Prevention Systems (NIPSs) have the extra
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ability to prevent the attacks from being successful. IDSs do not interfere with the network
performance requirement (in terms of delay) but exhibit poor protection, as the attacks
have already succeeded. On the other hand, IPSs can protect the network by dropping the
malicious packets that match any attack pattern; however, this can have a negative impact
on the network performance when the considered set of attack patterns increase.
Although many IDPS systems have been proposed, their appropriate configuration
and control for effective attacks detection/prevention and efficient resources consumption
has always been challenging [52, 99]. The evaluation of the IDPS performance for any
given security configuration is a crucial step for improving their realtime capability [236].
Another concern is related to the impact of security enforcement levels on the performance
and usability of an enterprise information system.
In this chapter, we analyze the impact of configuring an IDPS rule-checking process
along with its consequent action (i.e. alert or drop) on the resulting security of the network,
and on the average service time per event. We develop a new analytical model to inves-
tigate the relationship between the IDPS performance and its configuration. Our results
show that applying different sets of rules categories and configuration parameters impacts
average service time and affects system security.
The chapter proceeds with a background of the rule-checking process in Section 4.2.
In Section 4.3, we present an analytical model to investigate the relationship between
the IDPS performance and the rules mode selection. Section 4.4 presents the performance
analysis study of the impact of IDPS configuration on average service time. It also describes
the relationship between the system security level and different configuration parameters.
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Figure 4.1: Analysis Tasks for Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Rule-checking Operations
In this section, we describe the operation of existing intrusion detection and prevention
systems and some of the weaknesses inherent in them. Generally, IDPSs perform a number
of analysis tasks to identify malicious traffic. SNORT, for example, carries out the following
tasks (Figure 4.1):
• Data decoding: decodes the header information of the packet and translates specific
protocol elements into a data structure, for the use of the following tasks.
• Preprocessing: examines the packet for malicious activity that can not be captured
by signature matching or performs a number of preliminary steps in the packet, i.e.,
normalization, fragmentation reassembly, stream reconstruction, etc.
• Rule checking: examines the packet to determine if it is associated with an intrusion.
There are two types of rules an IDPS can handle: content-based and non-content-
based. The former is divided into three main sections: 1) action to be taken, 2)
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header specifying protocol, IP addresses, and ports information, and 3) an option
stating which parts of the packet should be inspected for determining the presence
of a particular pattern, or a collection of patterns. The non-content-based rule is
similar to the content-based one except that there is no pattern to look for.
• Action execution: the action describes what response an IDPS can perform when
a packet matches a specified rule. The main actions include (but are not limited
to): logging a packet (log), generating an alert (alert), dropping a packet (drop),
terminating a connection (reject), and ignoring a packet (pass).
Our analysis will be limited to the rule-checking process along with the action associated
with each rule. Once rules are selected and initialized, they are grouped by protocol type
(i.e., tcp, udp, icmp, ect.), and then by ports, then by those with content and those
without. For each content-based group, a multi-pattern matcher is constructed for all
rules by choosing a single pattern from all patterns in each rule option (e.g., SNORT uses
longest pattern). Clearly, there is no pattern matcher for non-content-based rules. When a
packet arrives at the rule-checking engine, the corresponding multi-pattern matcher will be
called on to filter out (for further evaluation) the rules whose single pattern are matched.
The filtered rules can be large depending on the chosen patterns for the multi-pattern
matcher and on the number of rules within a group(i.e., http). The evaluation of these
filtered rules and the non-content-based rules are applied sequentially. Once a rule matches
a packet the corresponding action will be taken.
A rule can be either a detective or a preventive rule. A detective rule’s action is alert
and a preventive rule’s action is drop. The detective rule aims to inspect a copy of a
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packet transmitted over the network and generate an alert when a malicious pattern exists
in the packet content. Clearly, this passive inspection mode has no impact on the network
performance in terms of delay, as it checks only a copy of traffic for malicious activity,
while the actual traffic is delivered successfully. However, this inspection mode exhibits
a poor protection as it does not prevent an attack from succeeding. Unlike the detective
rule, the preventive rule is configured to be in-line mode so that traffic will be dropped
if it carries a malicious pattern that matches the rule. This preventive mode can meet
the security requirement but it can have a negative impact on the network performance,
especially when the attacking patterns increase.
4.3 Performance Evaluation Model
In this section, we develop an analytical model to study the impact of the vector G on the
resulting security of an enterprise information system and on the average service time to
inspect an event. We assume that the IDPS processes one event at a time. Once an event
arrives, it goes through a sequence of detection and/or prevention rules according to the
current configuration of the IDPS represented by vector G. The process terminates if the
event is dropped by a preventive rule or reported by a detective rule as a malicious event.
In case an event is normal, the process ends when all rules are checked.
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Table 4.1: SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Symbol Meaning
R Set of Detection and Prevention rules in IDPS.
N Number of rules contained by IDPS.
E An arriving event.
G Binary vector indicating whether a rule is a detective or preventive rule
A Set of attacks covered by IDPS
PM Prior probability of attack occurrence
FP False positive probability for the detection and prevention of IDPS
FN False negative probability for the detection and prevention of IDPS
T(ri) Processing time for rule ri
H(k) Vector indicating the proportion of malicious event of type i.
B(i) The blocking probability of a preventing rule ri
4.3.1 Definitions and Preliminaries
IDPS rules (or signatures) are classified into libraries. Each library contains a number of
rules that are related to a known attack type. For example, the FTP library contains all
rules related to attacks on FTP servers (i.e., SNORT (v 2.8.6) has a set of 58 libraries). Let
L = {l1, l2, . . . , lM} be the set of all available libraries. We let R(li) = {r1, r2, . . . , rNi}
denote the set of a finite number of rules included in a library li. The total number of rules
included in an IDPS is N = |R| = ∑Ni,where i = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
We consider an IDPS with R rules or signatures. We let R = {1, 2, . . . , N} denote a
finite set of rules. We assume that the security administrator is responsible for including
and excluding rules according to the specific needs of the protected network environment.
For instance, Snort allows the enabling/disabling of rule libraries or individual rules through
a set of configuration files. Furthermore, the security administrator can specify the mode
of the rules as being either in a detective or a preventive mode. To classify a rule as to
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which group it belongs to, we define a binary vector G = {g1, g2, . . . , gN} that indicates
whether a rule is a detective or preventive rule (i.e., detection mode if G(k) = 0, prevention
mode if G(k) = 1, where k = 1, 2,. . . , N). This binary vector is defined as corresponding
to rules vector R with N rules.
Each rule rk has a processing time Tk. We consider only the time that it takes a rule to
process an actual packet. Clearly, a detective rule that simply examines a copy of traffic
is assumed to require no processing time on the actual traffic. The processing time tk will
be considered only if the rule rk is in a preventive mode (G(k) = 1).
Each rule rk ∈ R is responsible for only one type of malicious event. We let A =
{a1, a2, . . . aN} be the set of different attacks covered by the IDPS, assuming that the
occurrence of each attack is independent of the others.
We denote E as being an arriving event or flow. A malicious event E part of an attack
of type k where k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} is denoted as E ← ak. Note that an event contains
at most only one type of maliciousness. We denote by E ← a0 a benign event which
does not contain any malicious content with regards to the different rules’ restrictions Ri
(i = 1, 2, . . . , N).
A rule ri announces event E as malicious with regard to attack type ai is defined
as E
ri← ai. Similarly, we define E ri← a0 to indicate that the event E is announced as
normal when no rule ri reports the presence of attack ai in it for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The
probability that rule rk triggers an arriving event E as malicious, given that it is malicious
with regards to attack type ak is defined by: Prob{E ri← ak | E ← ak} which is equal
to the true positive probability TPk =1-FNk. FNk represents the false negative rate of
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rule rk when mis-announcing a malicious event that contains an attack of type ak. We let
FPk=Prob{E ri← ak | E← a0} be the false positive rate of rule rk, that is, the probability
that rule rk triggers an arriving event E as malicious, given that it is not malicious with
regard to rule rk.
4.3.2 Characterization of Traffic
A site-specific risk analysis provides information about the malicious activities that were
encountered in the past. We believe that the risk analysis process is an important step to
quantitatively measure the network security. However, our focus is not on developing a
risk analysis model rather we are trying to benefit from information gathered by security
administrators during the site-specific risk analysis process which includes the proportion
of malicious events among all detected events, prior probability of maliciousness, false
positive rate, and false negative rate. We mentioned the risk analysis model here for the
sake of showing the feasibility of obtaining such parameters.
We denote PM as the probability of maliciousness that categorizes an arriving event E
to be malicious. This prior probability can be used to estimate future attacks. We denote
by H(k) the vector indicating the proportion of malicious events of type i among all the
malicious events for all i=1,. . . ,N. Clearly, the sum of this vector is equal 1 (
∑
H(i)=1,
i = 1, . . . , N).
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4.3.3 Average Processing Time
In this section, we evaluate the average service time of an IDPS. It is the time required by
the IDPS with a rule configuration G to successfully determine whether an arriving event is
accepted as a normal event or reported/rejected with the presence of an attack in it. In the
rule analysis process, preventive rules have a great impact on the service time of an IDPS.
For example, a significant improvement in processing time can be achieved if a frequently
triggered preventive rule is checked as early as possible because unnecessary analysis is
avoided. We define B(i) as the blocking probability of rule ri. It is the probability of
announcing an event as malicious by a preventing rule ri, ∀ i = 1,. . . , N . The blocking
probability of rule ri is defined by:
B(i) = Prob{E ri← ai,G(i)} (4.1)
where an event E is announced as malicious with an attack of type ai by a rule ri and
the rule is a preventive rule, G(i)=1.
In order for rule ri to announce an event as malicious, all previous rules have to announce
it as safe. In other words, an event should arrive at rule ri before any decision is taken on
it. This can be expressed as follows:
B(i) = Prob{E rj← a0(∀j < i),E ri← ai}G(i) (4.2)
Given that the event space consists of a malicious event of attack type k (E← ak) and
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benign event E← a0, we rewrite B(i) as follow:
B(i) = Prob{E← ak,E rj← a0(∀j < i),E ri← ai}G(i)
+ Prob{E← a0,E rj← a0(∀j < i),E ri← ai}G(i)
(4.3)
Let us consider the situation when the event is malicious. Clearly, the probability of
announcing an event as malicious by rule ri depends on the probability that the event is
malicious and on the probability of accepting the event as normal by all the rules previously
checked. We let the first term of Equation 4.3 be Bmal(i) and using the theorem of total
and conditional probability, Bmal(i) can be written as:
Bmal(i)=
N∑
k=1
Prob{E ri← ai | E rj← a0(∀j < i),E← ak}
× Prob{E rj← a0(∀j < i),E← ak}
(4.4)
The first term in Equation 4.4 represents the case when the IDPS announces the event as
malicious by rule rk given that the event arrives to rule ri and it is malicious. In this case,
the probability that the IDPS correctly announces the event as malicious or mistakenly
classifies it as malicious is defined as PBmal. This can be calculated as follows:
PBmal(k, i) =
 1− FNi if k = iFPi if k 6= i (4.5)
We let PEmal stand for the second term of Equation 4.4, which represents the probability
that the IDPS accepts the event as normal by all rules rj, j=1,. . . ,i-1, earlier than the
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current evaluated rule ri where the event E is malicious. We have two cases in this situation.
In the first case, the current evaluated rule ri is the first one (i=1), where no rule has been
checked so far. PEmal can be calculated as:
PEmal(k, i) = H(k)PM where i = 1. (4.6)
The second case of PEmal may be encountered when there is at least one rule rj that
has been checked before rule ri; that is, ri is not the first rule to be evaluated (i.e., i > 1).
Accordingly, PEmal can be calculated by:
PEmal(k, i) =

i−1∏
j=1
(
1− (1− FNj)G(j)
)
H(k)PM if k 6= j
i−1∏
j=1
(
1− FPjG(j)
)
H(k)PM if k = j
(4.7)
Now let us consider the situation when the event is normal. We are interested in the
probability of announcing an event as malicious by rule ri given that the event is safe and
all previously evaluated rules rj (i.e., j < i) mark the event as safe. This can be written
as:
Bsafe(i) = Prob{E ri← ai | E rj← a0(∀j < i),E← a0}
× Prob{E rj← a0(∀j < i),E← a0}
(4.8)
Applying the same steps used for the malicious case yields the following equation in a
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safe case:
Bsafe(i) =FPi ×

1− PM if i = 1
i−1∏
j=1
(
1− FPjG(j)
)
(1− PM) if i > 1
 (4.9)
Given the Equations 4.3, 4.4, and 4.9, we can calculate the blocking probability B(i)
of rule i as follows:
B(i) = Bmal(i)× G(i) +Bsafe(i)× G(i) (4.10)
where
Bmal(i) =
N∑
k=1
PBmal(k, i)× PEmal(i) (4.11)
Finally, we measure the average service time of an IDPS as follows:
Avg =
[
N∑
i=1
B(i)
N∑
k=1
T (k)G(k)
]
+
(
1−
N∑
i=1
B(i)
)
×
N∑
i=1
T (i)G(i)
(4.12)
4.3.4 Level of Security
The main objective of deploying any security tool is to protect the network from any
malicious activities. Measuring the impact of security configurations can help security
administrators in making optimal decisions about how to strengthen network security. In
IDPSs, rules in preventive mode have the capability of blocking attacks once they have
been matched. However, this induces a negative impact on network performance (i.e., E2E
delay, throughput, service usability, jitter, etc.) especially when the number of preventive
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rules increases. Therefore, the main concern is to find the appropriate balance between
security enforcement levels and the performance and usability of the network. Here, we
evaluate the impact of a chosen IDPS configuration on the resulting security of the system.
In particular, we are interested in measuring the probability of blocking an event given
that it is malicious.
S = Prob{E rj← ai | E←ai}
=
Prob{E ri← ai,E←ai}
Prob{E←ai}
=
N∑
i=1
Prob{E ri← ai,E ri← ai} × G(i)
Prob{E←ai}
(4.13)
Using Equation 4.3 in Equation 4.13 yields:
S =
N∑
i=1
N∑
k=1
PBmal(i)× PEmal(i)× G(i)
PM
(4.14)
4.3.5 Accuracy of Action
The capability of an IDPS to apply different rule modes (i.e., alert or block) motivated
the need for measuring action accuracy. Therefore, we study the action that is taken by
the IDPS against an arriving event. The action of the IDPS could be either accepting or
blocking an event. The accuracy of action is defined as taking the right action with regards
to an arriving event. That is, the action of the IDPS is accurate if it accepts an event that
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is normal and/or blocks a malicious event. We define the accuracy of action Aacc as the
probability of either accepting a benign event or blocking a malicious one. Aacc can be
written as follows:
Aacc = Prob{E←ai,E ri← ai}+ Prob{E←a0,E ri← a0} (4.15)
Using the conditional probability theorem yields:
Aacc = Prob{E ri← ai | E←ai}Prob{E←ai}
+ Prob{E ri← a0 | E←a0}Prob{E←a0}
(4.16)
By substituting 4.14 in 4.16, the action accuracy taken by the IDPS for an arriving event
is as follows:
Aacc = S × PM +
N∏
i=1
(
1− FPiG(i)
)
× (1− PM) (4.17)
The evaluation of the IDPS action accuracy is essential not only in characterizing its
capability of correctly detecting/preventing attacks but also it help security analysts in
analyzing its impact on the network performance. Basically, the action taken by the IDPS
when attack is announced has some influences on the usability of the protected system. In
other words, blocking legitimate traffic is always undesirable and happened by the action of
the IDPS rules. Therefore, IDPS with a high action accuracy is preferred and recommended
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4.3.6 Accuracy of Decision
In this section, we analyze the decision accuracy made by the IDPS. This refers to the
decision to announce an arriving event as malicious or not, regardless of the action taken
as a result of the announcement. The decision is accurate when announcing an arriving
malicious event as malicious while not doing so with the benign one. Therefore, the accu-
racy of the decision is defined as the probability of either triggering an event as malicious
while it is malicious or not triggering the event when it is normal. This is equivalent to
the complement of making a wrong decision with regards to an arriving event. That is,
the decision accuracy of the IDPS is the complement of announcing an event as malicious
where it is not malicious or announcing a benign event as malicious. The inaccuracy of
the decision can be written as follows:
Dacc = Prob{E←ai,E ri← a0}+ Prob{E←a0,E ri← ai} (4.18)
Solving this equation results in:
Dacc =
(
1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− FPi
))× (1− PM)
+
N∑
k=1
FNk
N∏
i=1
i 6=k
(
1− FPi
)×H(k)PM . (4.19)
The difference between the action and decision accuracy is that the former concerns
the response taken by a triggered rule to either block an arriving event or to accept it.
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The latter concerns the decision of announcing an arriving event as malicious or benign.
Clearly, the rule’s mode of an IDPS has no impact on the decision accuracy but it affects
the action accuracy. For instance, the action of an IDPS is considered to be inaccurate
if a malicious event matches a specified rule which is in a detective mode (alert). This
is because the malicious traffic has not been blocked by the detective rule. The action
accuracy can be identical to the decision accuracy when the IDPS is configured to operate
entirely in IDS mode (i.e., the action of all the rules is alert) or entirely in IPS mode (see
Table 4.2 when IPS=100%).
4.4 Performance Evaluation and Results
In this section, we study the impact of the IDPS configuration on the average service time.
We also measure the security level of the system when choosing different configuration
parameters. The results are derived using both analytical and simulation approaches.
The simulations are performed using a new discrete-event simulation tool developed under
Matlab [293]. In order to test the validity of our work while keeping the case simple, we
assign equal processing time for all the rules (one unit of time), we let the proportion of
maliciousness be equally distributed H(i)/N , i = 1, . . . , N , and we set the probability of
maliciousness to be PM=0.5. For simplicity, we assume that the false detection rates, FP
and FN, are measured for the entire rule-checking engine of an IDPS.
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Figure 4.2: Average Service Time for Number of Rules when (PM ,IPS)=(0.5,75%)
4.4.1 Parameters estimation
The challenge involved in performance analysis of a security system so as to reduce resource
utilization while preserving a good level of security enforcement is the need to obtain
estimates for the various parameters used in the analysis. For instance, the false positive
(FP) and false negative (FN) rates can be accomplished by either using proper training
data sets or by analyzing the past behavior of the system [143]. The rule processing
time T can be measured experimentally. SNORT, for instance, provides statistics on rule
performance through a simple configuration option (i.e., profile rules). For each rule,
SNORT provides an estimate of how much it takes to process a packet. The prior probability
of attack occurrence (PM) and the proportion of attacks (H) can be initially estimated using
a site-specific risk analysis approach and updated with new attacks accordingly.
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Figure 4.3: Average Service Time for Number of Rules when (PM ,IPS)=(0.5,50%)
4.4.2 Average Service Time
The average service time is calculated as the time required for an event to be completely
served. An event is served once a detective/preventive rule finds a match and triggers its
action or once the event is identified as normal. Our goal in this experiment is to show the
impact of the increasing number of rules N on the average service time when processing
an event using different preventive rule percentages. For each preventive percentage, we
plot the average service time using different detection rates. Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show
the results when selecting the percentage of preventive rules to be 75%, 50%, and 10%
respectively.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the impact of increasing the number of rules on the average service
time when 75% of the rules are in preventive mode. Figure 4.2 shows that the larger N
is, the longer service time becomes. When we reach approximately 100 rules, the system
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Figure 4.4: Average Service Time for Number of Rules when (PM ,IPS)=(0.5,10%)
reaches the saturation state and additional rules result in very little further impact. Prior
to the saturation region, a reduction in the number of rules results in an improvement
in average service time. In this situation, a malicious event is likely to be missed by the
rule accountable for it and accordingly is examined by other rules that are not responsible
for it. Thus, a reduction in the false negative rate yields no appreciable improvement in
average service time. The false negative rate has little impact on the average service time.
However, this is not the case when the value of FP increases. Rather, there is a notable
reduction in average service time when the rate of false positives increases. This occurs
because of an early decision made as a result of a wrong diagnosis. In this case, an increase
in the number of rules has only a slight impact on average service time.
When the percentage of preventive rules is 50%, Figure 4.3 appears quite similar to
Figure 4.2. Increasing the number of rules, false positives, and false negatives impacts the
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Figure 4.5: Impact of Detection Rates on Average Service Time when IPS=75%
average service time in a way very similar to that illustrated in Figure 4.2. However, the
average service time approaches the saturation state more slowly than in the previous case
when 75% of the rules are preventive. That is, the improvement in average service time is
limited once the saturation point of approximately 130 rules is reached (out of 200 rules).
In Figure 4.4, when 10% of the rules are in preventive mode, we observe a somewhat
different impact on the average service time. Figure 4.4 shows that the average service
time increases linearly with the number of rules. Improvement in average service time in
this case is obviously the most advantageous of the three scenarios, because the saturation
point is not reached until approximately 180 rules.
To conclude, the potential for improvement in average service time increases as we
reduce the percentage of preventive rules. Of course, the price one has to pay for reduction
in the number of preventive rules is a corresponding decrease in enterprise network security.
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Figure 4.6: Impact of Detection Rates on Average Service Time when IPS=50%
In the following set of experiments, we focus on the average service time as a function
of increasing both the false positive and false negative rates. We are interested in un-
derstanding the impact of the detection rates on the average time required to completely
inspect an arriving event. The number of rules in this case is chosen to be 100. Figures
4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 show the impact of varying the false positive rate while fixing the false
negative rate and using different preventive rule percentages.
Figure 4.5 presents the results when 75% of the rules are preventive. We can see that
the average service time decreases with an increase in the false positive rate for all false
negative rate values. We can see that the average service time is longer when the IDPS
becomes accurate in terms of the false positive rate, no matter what the false negative rates
are. Indeed, the IDPS consumes more time to correctly distinguish the malicious events
from the benign ones rather than just mistakenly identifying a malicious event at an early
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Figure 4.7: Impact of Detection Rates on Average Service Time when IPS=10%
stage.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show similar results, except that a dramatic decrease in average
service time results from the reduction of the percentage of preventive mode services.
However, with the use of different preventive mode percentages, the average service time
approaches saturation differently. That is, when the IPS percentage is large, the average
service time reaches saturation quickly. In contrast, the saturation state is reached more
slowly as the IPS percentage decreases. Clearly, the impact on average service time will
be no more than 10 units of time when 10% of the rules are in IPS mode (see Figure 4.7).
Figures 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 plot the impact of changing the false negative detection
rate (FN) for different false positive rates and with the use of different preventive rule
percentages. Clearly, a reduction in the percentage of preventive rules results in a significant
reduction in average service time. Furthermore, an increase in the rate of false negatives
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Figure 4.8: Impact of Detection Rates on Average Service Time when IPS=75%
produces very little change in average service time.
4.4.3 Level of Security and Accuracy
In this section, we intend to study the impact of choosing different configuration parameters
on the security of the system and on the action and decision accuracy. The results are
achieved using both the analytical and the simulation models that we have developed. For
all results in this section, we based our study on a total of 100 rules. Table 4.2 presents
the impact of varying four configuration parameters, including FP, FN, PM , and IPS% on
security and accuracy of the system. Clearly, an increase in the preventive rule percentage
yields a corresponding improvement in system security. Nevertheless, a system still has
a good level of security even though the percentage of preventive rules is relatively low.
For example, when FP is 0.5, FN is 0.1, and IPS is 10%, the security result reach 79%.
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Figure 4.9: Impact of Detection Rates on Average Service Time when IPS=50%
However, the accuracy of action and decision for this case are not satisfactory.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied how choosing which rules are preventive or detective has an
impact on the security of the system, on the average service time, and on the decision
and action accuracy of an IDPS. We developed a new analytical model to investigate the
relationship between IDPS performance and its configuration. Simulation was conducted
to validate our performance analysis study. Our results show that applying different sets
of rules categories and configuration parameters impacts average service time and affects
system security. The results demonstrate that it is desirable to strike a balance between
system security and network performance in terms of delay.
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Figure 4.10: Impact of Detection Rates on Average Service Time when IPS=10%
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Table 4.2: Selected Results of Security level, Decision Accuracy, and Action Accuracy with
Different Configuration Sets
Configuration
Parameters
Analytical Results Simulation Results
FP FN PM Security ActionAccuracy
Decision
Accuracy
Security
Action
Accuracy
Decision
Accuracy
10% IPS
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3340 0.7624 0.4099 0.3263 0.7611 0.4104
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3340 0.5720 0.6550 0.3310 0.5687 0.6565
0.5 0.1 0.1 0.7900 0.3040 0.1009 0.7939 0.3056 0.1007
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2620 0.7552 0.3944 0.2654 0.7548 0.3942
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.2620 0.5360 0.5775 0.2597 0.5354 0.5778
0.5 0.5 0.1 0.7500 0.3000 0.1008 0.7493 0.2991 0.1003
50% IPS
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6720 0.5986 0.4099 0.6650 0.5956 0.4094
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6720 0.6312 0.6550 0.6723 0.6315 0.6555
0.5 0.1 0.1 0.9813 0.1263 0.1009 0.9790 0.1272 0.1028
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5407 0.5855 0.3944 0.5461 0.5862 0.3959
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5407 0.5656 0.5775 0.5373 0.5631 0.5774
0.5 0.5 0.1 0.9688 0.1250 0.1008 0.9662 0.1233 0.0995
75% IPS
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8193 0.5124 0.4099 0.8196 0.5121 0.4100
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.8193 0.6488 0.6550 0.8197 0.6490 0.6546
0.5 0.1 0.1 0.9966 0.1067 0.1009 0.9959 0.1069 0.1009
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.6705 0.4975 0.3944 0.6780 0.4989 0.3963
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.6705 0.5744 0.5775 0.6760 0.5780 0.5806
0.5 0.5 0.1 0.9922 0.1063 0.1008 0.9931 0.1064 0.1006
100% IPS
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9613 0.4099 0.4099 0.9578 0.4113 0.4113
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.9613 0.6550 0.6550 0.9616 0.6559 0.6559
0.5 0.1 0.1 0.9998 0.1009 0.1009 0.9998 0.0993 0.0993
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.8063 0.3944 0.3944 0.8068 0.3952 0.3952
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.8063 0.5775 0.5775 0.8081 0.5771 0.5771
0.5 0.5 0.1 0.9990 0.1008 0.1008 0.9991 0.1006 0.1006
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Chapter 5
Optimization of Security
Configuration
5.1 Introduction
IDPS design and operation for efficient attack detection and prevention combined with
efficient resource usage are desperately needed [52, 99]. Evaluating IDPS performance for
a particular security configuration is a key step towards improving their realtime ability
[31, 236]. Another concern relates to the impact of safety measures on the performance
and usability of an enterprise information system.
In this chapter, we propose a rule mode selection optimization technique that aims
at determining an appropriate IDPS configuration set in order to maximize the security
enforcement levels while avoiding any unnecessary network performance degradation. The
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proposed method demonstrates that different sets of rules categories and configuration
parameters have varying impacts on service time and system security. As a result, it is
judicious to seek a balance between security and performance tby determining the appro-
priate IDPS configuration.
This chapter proceeds with addressing the problem of determining the appropriate IDPS
configuration set in Section 5.2. We evaluate the efficiency of the Rule Mode Selection
Technique (RMST ) using simulations in Section 5.3. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes the
chapter.
5.2 Optimization of IDPS Rule Mode Selection
In this section we address the problem of determining the appropriate IDPS configuration
set necessary to balance network security and performance. As explained before, IDPS
preventive rules have the capability of blocking attacks once they have been matched.
However, this induces a negative impact on network performance in terms of delay, espe-
cially when the number of preventive rules increases. Therefore, the main concern is to
find the appropriate preventive rule set that maximizes security enforcement levels while
avoiding any unnecessary performance degradation in terms of delay. We assume that the
security administrator excludes the rules that are supposed to be strictly in preventive or
detective modes. The optimal solution for the rule mode selection (RMS) problem is the
one that can maximize the prevention level and minimize system delay. The RMS problem
is NP-hard due to the maximal minimal matching of its multiple objectives. Indeed, the
RMS problem can be reduced to a 0-1 knapsack problem known to be NP-complete [129]
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and is therefore NP-complete.
5.2.1 Rule Mode Selection Problem Formulation
The rule mode selection problem is formulated as follows: Given a set of IDPS rules, find a
legitimate preventive rule subset that maximizes the level of security, subject to the delay
constraint. In our study, we assume a sequential rule checking process where each event
passes through a sequence of rules until a decision is made. For an IDPS with N rules
associated with weight wi that resembles the dominance of rule ri in the expected value
metric, we can then formalize the RMS problem as a binary integer program (BIP) as
follows:
max
N∑
i=1
wixi
s.t. (a)
N∑
i=1
tixi ≤ Dmax
(b) xi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {i = 1, . . . , N}.
(5.1)
where xi is a binary variable such that xi = 1 if rule ri is a preventive rule and xi = 0 if rule
ri is a detective rule. The rule weight computation is explained in more detail later in this
section. Inequality (a) provides an upper bound on the expected response time. Since the
expected response time for an event entering the system is proportional to the number of
preventive rules, an event has to be served at a rate faster than the arrival rate in order to
preserve the stability of the system. The delay constraint is thus translated into an upper
bound Dmax on the number of preventive rules as the mean of the inter-arrival rate.
The RMS problem can be mapped to the 0-1 knapsack problem [129] in order to alleviate
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the complexity of its max-min nature. In 0-1 knapsack problem, we are given n items, each
associated with a value and weight; the objective is to select a set of items that maximize
the total value where the total weight is less than or equal to a given value W . The RMS
problem is similar to the 0-1 knapsack problem, where the weight of the rule wi is similar
to the item’s value and the upper limit response time is similar to the maximum allowed
weight.
5.2.2 RMS Technique
The optimal solution of the RMS problem can be obtained using an exhaustive search in the
solution space. However, such a brute force method becomes computationally impractical
when the number of rules is large. The use of a heuristic solution allows us to obtain a
reasonably good solution in polynomial time without searching the entire solution space.
Indeed, using optimization techniques Branch & Bound and Branch & Cut for solving
the RMS problem is not practical when the rules number is high due to the size of the
search space. On the other hand, the results obtained from a simple selection method, e.g.,
a Greedy Algorithm, can meet the computational time requirement, but jeopardizes the
system security requirements. Therefore, we propose a heuristic-based rules mode selection
technique (RMST) which can obtain a solution for the RMS problem in polynomial time,
while the system security level remains in good agreement with the results obtained using
the optimal solution. RMST is illustrated in Algorithm 1 and the use of the rule weight
computation is described in the following section.
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Algorithm 1 OptimizeRuleSelection: rule set, Dmax
1: Dsum ← 0
2: pool list← empty
3: for ri : i = 0 to N do
4: if t(ri) + Dsum ≤ Dmax then
5: prevention list ← ri
6: Dsum ← Dsum + t(ri)
7: else if prevention list is not empty then
8: for rj : j = 0 to N do
9: if (ri ∈ prevention list; wj ≥ wi; tj ≤ ti) then
10: remove ri from prevention list;
11: prevention list ← rj ;
12: Dsum ← Dsum + t(rj) - t(rj)
13: pool list← ri
14: end if
15: end for
16: if Dsum < Dmax then
17: Add valid rules from pool list to prevention list
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: Return prevention list
5.2.3 Rule Weight Computation
In this section, we describe the technique used for computing rule weight with the intention
of capturing the importance of every rule in the IDPS. We assign a weight to each rule
in the rule configuration set that reflects its value in protecting the network by the IDPS.
Two factors can be used to calculate the rule weight: (1) potential damage that can be
prevented by a true detection, and (2) operational loss which is incurred due to the false
detection.
Potential damage D(ri): the damage prevented by rule ri can be measured by using
the severity of an attack and the accuracy of rule ri. The attack severity measures the
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risk level posed by a particular attack. We let Sev(ri) denote the severity score for rule ri
that is responsible for attack ai. There are several knowledge base sources which provide
severity scores for known attacks, including MITRE-CVE, NIST-NVD, Secunia, as well as
software developer specific severity score databases. For example, the FileZilla unspecified
format string vulnerability has been reported in NIST-NVD to be scored as 7.5 out of 10,
where SNORT includes a rule accountable for this attack with multiple score references. The
potential damage D(ri) can be expressed as follows:
D(ri) = (1− FNri)× Sevri (5.2)
where FNri is the false negative rate for rule ri and Sev(ri) is the severity score for rule
ri.
Operational loss L(ri): The operational loss incurred due to rule ri can be measured
using the cost associated to the response triggered by false detection of rule ri. For example,
cost of blocking legitimate traffic or analyzing false alarm. This cost can be estimated based
on the business impact specific to the site as follow.
L(ri) = FPri × Costri (5.3)
where FPri is the false positive rate for rule ri and Costri is the cost score for rule ri.
The rule weight w(ri) can be computed using the potential damage and operational
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loss as follows:
w(ri) =
(
α×D(ri)− (1− α)× L(ri)
)×H(ri)× PM (5.4)
where α is a configurable parameter indicating how much of the rule weight should rely on
the potential damage and operational loss, H(ri) is a vector indicating the proportion of
malicious events for rule ri among all the malicious events for all rules i = 1, . . . , N , and
PM is the prior probability of attack occurrence. In Algorithm 1, the rule weight w(ri)
function is leveraged to select preventive rules that maximize the system security level
within the maximum allowed delay Dmax (line 7-18). The factors used to calculate the
rule weight can be obtained during the site-specific risk analysis. The goal is to benefit
from information gathered by security administrators during the site-specific risk analysis
process about activities that were encountered in the past. Among these are false positive
rate, false negative rate, and H and PM .
5.3 Performance Evaluation and Results
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of RMST. A number of simulation experiments
were conducted to evaluate RMST. We also present the optimal solution produced by
solving the Binary Integer Program (BIP) of the RMS problem using matlab [293].
In the first experiment, we examine the accuracy of our technique in selecting the
preventive rules subset. We analyze the impact of varying the maximum delay constraint
(Dmax) on the resulting security and on the preventive rules selection. In this scenario,
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Figure 5.1: Gain percentage when varying delay constraint using different methods
the total number of rules is 200. The weight and processing time of the rules are assigned
based on zipf distribution [299] similar to [69].
Three techniques beside RMST are evaluated and all techniques’ results are compared in
Figure 5.1. A simple solution for the RMS problem can be obtained by a greedy algorithm,
where rules are sorted by their processing time in decreasing order and chosen sequentially
until the maximum allowed delay is achieved. However, the cost-benefit gain of the greedy
algorithm is not desirable in terms of system security performance. Although the cost-
benefit gain obtained using branch and bound (BB) and dynamic programming (DP) for
the RMS problem is better than our proposed technique, when the number of rules increases
the computational time of (BB) or (DP) becomes unacceptable for our application. In turn
the proposed RMST solves the problem in polynomial time, and the obtained rule set has
an acceptable security level.
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Figure 5.2: Number of selected rules versus Dmax using different methods
The qualitative and quantitative comparison of selected rules is shown in Figure 5.2.
The comparison shows that the number of preventive rules selected in (BB) or (DP) is
lower than in others; however, the cost-benefit gain is maximum. On the other hand, the
quality of the rules selected by the greedy algorithm is the lowest in terms of the cost-benefit
gain, so the number of the preventive rules is high in order to satisfy the system security
performance, whereas RMST selects prevention rules with a more balanced cost-benefit
gain.
The scale of the IDPS system affects the required computational time to find an optimal
solution. Specifically, 2N combinations have to be computed in order to obtain the optimal
solution. When the rules number is high, the search space is very large; therefore, the
computational time needed is high, too. Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between the
number of rules and the computational time. The Branch and Bound method takes a
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Figure 5.3: Computational time when increasing preventive rules
longer time so it is not included in Figure 5.3. The greedy algorithm and RMST do not
suffer from scalability issue. While the number of preventive rules and the computational
time are related exponentially in Dynamic Programming (DP), limiting the applicability
of DP to a small number of IDPS rules.
The second set of experiments studies the impact of the accuracy of the rules set in
terms of FP and FN on the average response time and the total number of preventives
rules selected by BB and RMST techniques. The average response time is measured by
the performance analysis model presented in Section 4.4 for any configuration set chosen
by BB and RMST. The total number of rules is chosen to be 100 in this experiment. Also,
we set the probability of maliciousness to be PM = 0.5 and α = 0.7.
Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 plot the average response time as a function of increasing
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Figure 5.4: Impact of detection rates on average response time when Dmax=high
both the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) rates. Figure 5.4 presents the results
when Dmax is relatively high. We can see that the average response time decreases with an
increase in the FN for all FP values. We can see that the average response time is longer
when the IDPS becomes accurate in terms of the FN rate, no matter what the FP rates
are. We can see that the BB technique adapts its selection criteria according to the change
in the accuracy values while the RMST remains the same. This happens because assigning
a high value to the Dmax constraint is similar as if we are relaxing it.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the impact of the accuracy parameters when Dmax is set to be
low. The figures share similar results to the previous case, except that the gap between
BB and RMST in average response time is reduced. This is because the low value of
the Dmax restriction makes the BB adapt its selection criteria. Overall, with a high FN
rate, the average response time is similar for both techniques, although the BB has better
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Figure 5.5: Impact of detection rates on average response time when Dmax=low
average response time when the FN rate is very low. In other words, FN rate affects the
optimization results, and thus system performance will be affected.
Finally, 5.6 shows the sharp relation between FN rate and system performance in terms
of number of preventive rules and average response time.
5.4 Conclusion
We proposed a rule mode selection optimization technique called RMST that aims at
determining an appropriate IDPS configuration set that maximizes security enforcement
levels while avoiding unnecessary network performance degradation. With a small number
of IDPS rules, a configuration set can be completed to achieve optimal results; however,
when the number of IDPS rules is large, the computation time becomes unacceptable from
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Figure 5.6: Impact of detection rates on average response time when Dmax=low
a network performance point of view. RMST was shown to reconcile these two conflicting
goals of guaranteeing network security and network performance.
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Chapter 6
Markovian based Queuing Analysis
Model
6.1 Introduction
The design of an IDPS poses many challenges including how to identify attack signatures,
how to improve the detection engine, and how to manage the system. A large body of
work has addressed these issues; however, little work focused on the impact of deploying
an IDPS on network performance in terms of processing delay, throughput, and packet
loss [31, 52, 99, 236]. Ironically, while the IDPS can efficiently detect and prevent many
attacks that can compromise network performance, it may cause performance degradation
itself. For instance, the processing delay of the IDPS can increase significantly as the size
of the signature database grows. In addition, the IDPS may not be able to cope with the
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increase in the amount of traffic, mainly because of limited resources in terms of CPU and
memory. This particular case usually leads to an increase in packet queue length, resulting
in higher waiting times for packets, and eventually packets to be dropped. Here, the IDPS
becomes the network bottleneck, and its intervention no longer appropriate. To decrease
queuing delay, processing time, and packet loss due to the IDPS, its configuration should
be adjusted such that the complexity of the detection engine is reduced by decreasing IDPS
attack coverage. As a consequence, the operator faces a trade-off between guaranteeing
required security enforcement levels on one hand and Quality of Service (QoS) requirements
on the other. Thus, it is crucial to study the impact of different IDPS configurations on
network performance and select the one that satisfies both security objectives and QoS
requirements.
In this chapter we analyze the performance of the IDPS for different configurations and
under different traffic characteristics. Different from existing works on IDPS performance
analysis, we develop an analytical model for the system based on an embedded Markov
chain, to predict the impact of IDPS operations on network performance. We then leverage
the model to provide mathematical derivations of key performance metrics; namely: the
throughput, queuing delay, system utilization, and packet loss at the IDPS level. We
define many configurations for the IDPS that reflect security enforcement levels and we
study their effect on the network performance metrics under different traffic intensities.
The analytical model is then validated through extensive simulations. Ultimatelly, our
model allows security administrators to strike a balance between security level and network
performance.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents our analytical
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Figure 6.1: Analysis Tasks for Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
model for the IDPS based on a finite queuing system. In Section 6.3, we provide the
performance evaluation of the IDPS analysis model. Finally, we draw our conclusions in
Section 6.4.
6.2 Queuing Analysis Model
In this study, we consider that the IDPS operation involves mainly two stages: header
analysis and content analysis, as shown in Figure 6.1. The header analysis stage examines
packets for many types of malicious activity. For instance, this first analysis can detect
attacks that exploit fragmentation vulnerabilities, such as the Ping of Death attack where
attackers use many small fragmented ICMP packets such that their assembling results in
a huge packet that exceeds the maximum allowable size for an IP datagram [230]. If a
particular packet is identified as belonging to an attack, there is no need to do any further
analysis. Thus, the first stage processing result allows the IDPS to decide to either release
the packet to the network without any further analysis or to forward it to the content
analysis for further checking. The content analysis stage is usually a rule-checking engine
that uses a signature database to determine whether the examined packet belongs to any
malicious traffic. Generally, this second stage is more time-consuming than the first one.
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Figure 6.2: Tandem Queue Model with Blocking
In this study, we use a finite queuing model to analyze the performance of the IDPS.
6.2.1 Finite Queuing Model
In order to model the IDPS, we propose a two-stage embedded Markov chain [142, 174,
213, 257], as shown in Figure 6.2. The model consists of a FIFO queue and two servers.
The first and second servers correspond respectively to the header analysis and content
analysis stages. We assume that packets arrive at the IDPS according to a Poisson process
with an arrival rate λ. We assume a fixed packet size in order to simplify the analysis.
Packets join a finite queue of a maximum size L− 1 (L ∈ N∗). Only one packet at a time
is passed to the header analysis stage, which has an average service time of 1/µ. When the
header analysis is completed, the packet either leaves the system with an early decision
probability p or moves to the second stage, with a probability (1− p). The content header
process has an average service time of 1/α. Service times for both stages are exponentially
distributed. Packets are considered lost only when the buffer becomes full and they cannot
join the IDPS system. In order to make the analytical solution feasible, we consider Poisson
arrivals, exponential services, and fixed packet sizes. This applies only for certain types
of traffic, as reported in [166]. Considering other distributions and variable packet sizes is
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part of our future work.
On the other hand, we assume that the header analysis stage can not accept any new
packets if the content analysis process is already busy. Thus, the execution of the two
stages is mutually exclusive, i.e., if one of the stages is running, the other is idle. This
assumption is realistic for two reasons. The first reason is that the CPU is usually executing
only one task at a time. The second reason is that if we allow the pre-processor stage to
accept packets while the rule-checking stage is busy, we need to introduce another queue at
the second server. However, this situation can result in out-of-order packets, as the service
times of the two stages are different and some packets can directly leave the system from
the first stage. In practice, the service time of packet header analysis is much lower than
that of the content checking (α < µ), since the underlying idea behind the header analysis
stage is to avoid detailed rule-checking if an anomaly is detected by looking at the header
alone.
We represent the behavior of the multi-stage service queuing system by a finite queuing
model based on the embedded Markov chain process with a state space S = {(n,m), 0 <
n ≤ L,m = {1, 2}}, where n denotes the number of packets in the system and m denotes
the stage which the IDPS is performing. In particular, in the first stage (m = 1), the IDPS
is performing the packet processing task, and when m = 2, the IDPS is performing the
rule-checking process. The queuing system has a buffer size of L−1. State (0, 0) represents
the special case when the IDPS is idle.
From the state transition diagram depicted in Figure 6.3, we can infer steady-state
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Figure 6.3: State Transition Diagram for Finite Queuing Model
equations. Thus, for the initial states (0,0), (1,1), and (1,2), we have:
0 = −λq
0,0
+ pµq
1,1
+ αq
1,2
at state (0, 0)
0 = −(λ+ µ)q
1,1
+ λq
0,0
+ pµq
2,1
+ αq
2,2
at state (1, 1)
0 = −(λ+ α)q
1,2
+ (1− p)µq
1,1
at state (1, 2)
For intermediate states (n, 1) and (n, 2), where n ∈ [2, L− 1], we have:
0=−(λ+ µ)q
n,1
+λq
n-1,1
+p µ qn+1,1+αqn+1,2 at state (n, 1)
0=−(λ+ α)q
n,2
+λq
n-1,2
+(1− p)µq
n,1
at state (n, 2)
At the boundary states (L, 1) and (L, 2), steady-state equations are expressed as follows:
0 = −µq
L,1
+ λq
L-1,1
at state (L, 1)
0 = −αq
L,2
+ λq
L-1,2
+ (1− p)µq
L,1
at state (L, 2)
Based on these equations, we would like to express q
n,1
and q
n,2
in terms of q
0,0
. It
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is straightforward to calculate the probabilities of the initial and boundary states. Thus,
from state equations (0, 0) and (1, 2), the probabilities q
1,1
and q
1,2
can be expressed in
terms of q
0,0
as follows:
q
1,1
=
(α + λ)λ
(α + p)µ
q
0,0
q
1,2
=
λ− pλ
α + pλ
q
0,0
In order to calculate the state probabilities q
n,1
and q
n,2
in terms of q
0,0
where n ∈
[1, L− 1], we define (w
n,1
)n∈[1,L−1] and (wn,2)n∈[1,L−1] such as:
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w
0,1
= w
0,2
= 1
w
1,1
= (α+λ)λ
(α+p)µ
w
1,2
= λ−pλ
α+pλ
w
n,1
= (α+λ)(λ+µ)
(pλ+α)µ
w
n-1,1
− (λ+α)
(λp+α)
w
n-2,1
2 ≤ n < L
− (λα)
(λp+α)µ
w
n-1,2
w
n,2
= λ
λ+α
w
n-1,2
+ (1−p)µ
λ+α
w
n,1
2 ≤ n < L
(6.1)
Using state equations (n, 1) and (n, 2) along with the definition of (w
n,1
)n∈[1,L−1] and
(w
n,2
)n∈[1,L−1], we can express qn,1 and qn,2 in terms of q0,0 as follows
1 :
q
n,1
= wn,1q0,0 (6.2)
q
n,2
= wn,2q0,0
1These equations can be easily demonstrated using mathematical induction, where steady-state equa-
tions (2, 1), (2, 2) and (n − 1, 1), (n, 2) can be used respectively to check the base case and validate the
inductive step.
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Furthermore, the probabilities at the boundaries are calculated in terms of q
0,0
based
on equations (L, 1), (L, 2) and (6.1) as follows:
q
L,1
=

(
λ
µ
)
w
L-1,1
q
0,0
L > 1(
λ
µ
)
q
0,0
L = 1
q
L,2
=

λ
α
(w
L-1,2
+ (1− p)w
L-1,1
)q
0,0
L > 1( (1−p)λ
α
)
q
0,0
L = 1
The next step is to determine q
0,0
. For this purpose we use the normalization condition,
which is expressed as follows:
q
0,0
+
L∑
n=1
(q
n,1
+ q
n,2
) = 1 (6.3)
Using equation (6.2), we obtain:
q
0,0
+
L∑
n=1
(w
n,1
+ w
n,2
)q
0,0
= 1
⇒q
0,0
=
1
1 +
∑L
n=1(wn,1 + wn,2)
(6.4)
Based on equations (6.1), (6.2), and (6.4), it is possible to calculate the steady-state
probabilities, and then we are able to determine the different performance metrics of the
system at the steady state. The next subsection discusses those metrics.
94
Security Service time
level Stage one(1/µ) Stage two(1/α)
1 0.5µs 4µs
2 0.5µs 8µs
3 0.5µs 12µs
4 5µs 12µs
Table 6.1: Security enforcement levels and their corresponding processing time
6.2.2 Performance metrics
In this section, we identify the metrics that should be measured at the IDPS system level
and which have an impact on the network performance. Particularly, end-to-end delay
and packet loss ratio can be directly affected respectively by the average time spent in
the IDPS per packet and the packet loss ratio at the IDPS level. Furthermore, other
important metrics are also considered in our study, such as the mean system throughput,
the average number of packets in the system, and packet average waiting delay. In the
following, we provide the equation of each of those metrics as a function of the steady-
state probabilities [257].
The average of the IDPS throughput γ is the average number of packets (per second)
leaving the IDPS system either from the first stage or the second one and regardless of the
decision of the IDPS with respect to packets. It is expressed as follows:
γ = pµ
L∑
n=1
q
n,1
+ α
L∑
n=1
q
n,2
(6.5)
The packet loss probability q
lost
is the probability of being in the state (L, 1) or (L, 2). This
means that the queue is full, and as a consequence incoming packets will not be admitted.
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Figure 6.4: Throughput versus packet arrival rate for different Security Enforcement Levels
(L = 25, p = 0.3).
It is given by:
q
lost
= q
L,1
+ q
L,2
(6.6)
The average number of packets X¯ in the system can be expressed as follows:
X¯ =
L∑
n=1
n(q
n,1
+ q
n,2
) (6.7)
The average time that a packet spends in the system Ws is then expressed using X¯ and
γ as:
Ws =
X¯
γ
(6.8)
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Figure 6.5: Packet loss ratio versus packet arrival rate for different Security Enforcement
Levels (L = 25, p = 0.3).
The average service time of the two stages denoted Wa is given by:
Wa =
1
µ
+
1− p
α
The average time spent by a packet in the queue Wq can be measured as follows:
Wq = Ws −Wa (6.9)
Based on those equations, we can compute the values of all the performance metrics.
The next section is dedicated to performance evaluation and the validation of the analytical
model using simulation .
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Figure 6.6: Average time spent in the system per packet versus packet arrival rate for
different Security Enforcement Levels (L = 25, p = 0.3).
6.3 Performance Evaluation and Results
The goal here is to validate our analytical model through simulations and to analyze the
effect of different security levels on network performance. We describe the settings of the
different security enforcement levels and then analyze the effect of the packet arrival rates,
the queue size, and the early decision probability p on the studied performance metrics.
For all experiments, we provide the results determined from the analytical model and from
simulations.
6.3.1 Experiments Settings
For the sake of our experiment, we defined four configurations that reflect different levels
of detection capabilities of the IDPS, and Table 6.2.1 illustrates the selected configuration
for each. While setting those values, we consider that the average service time at stage 2 is
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Figure 6.7: Throughput versus packet arrival rate for different queue size values (Security
Level 1, p = 0.3).
an increasing function of the number of selected rules. This is motivated by our previous
work, where we provide an analytical model that relates the service time to the number of
rules [31]. This was also shown in other works using real data [265].
At the first three levels, we fixed the processing time at the first stage. As the security
level is increased, the IDPS enlarges the selection of checking rules to improve the security
coverage, and therefore the server processing time at stage 2 increases. For instance, level
1 corresponds to the minimum detection level where a small set of rules is checked at stage
2, whereas levels 2 and 3 increase the size of the rule database to provide better detection
of malicious traffic. In addition, security level 4 is a particular case where both stages have
to check a larger number of rules in order to increase the protection capability of the IDPS,
especially at stage 1.
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Figure 6.8: Packet loss ratio versus packet arrival rate for different queue size values
(Security Level 1, p = 0.3).
6.3.2 Results
We conducted several experiments in order to validate the analytical results. Using Matlab
[293], we implemented a discrete-event simulation of finite queueing for the system. Every
simulation goes through independent sub-runs with different initial seeds (after discarding
the transient part), and is finished when the confidence interval of 95% is achieved [208].
In our first experiment, we evaluate the accuracy of the proposed queuing model for
a fixed queue size (L = 25), a fixed early decision probability (p = 0.3) and for different
security enforcement levels. The results are depicted in Figures 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. Each
figure shows a performance metric calculated, while varying the arrival rate, based on
the analytical model compared with the corresponding value obtained by simulation. We
can observe that the values obtained by simulation are almost identical to the analytical
ones (notice that in all figures, circles, which represent values obtained by simulations,
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Figure 6.9: Average time spent in the system per packet versus packet arrival rate for
different queue size values (Security Level 1, p = 0.3).
are overlapping with the points which represent the values obtained using the analytical
model).
On the other hand, the figures show the effect of the security level on the performance
metrics. As the security level is set higher, we can observe that the throughput (expressed
in Kilo packets per second (Kpps)) is decreasing (Figure 6.4) while the packet loss ratio
(Figure 6.5) and the average time spent in the system per packet (Figure 6.6) are in-
creasing. This shows clearly that improving security coverage comes at the expense of
performance. The degradation of performance is due to the extra analysis carried by the
IDPS in order to cover more attacks (by checking more rules).
The second set of experiments was conducted to evaluate the effect of the queue size
(L). Therefore, we fixed other parameters like the security level (set to 1) and probability
(set to 0.3). Figures 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 show the different metrics. It shows that although
increasing the size of the queue can slightly improve the throughput (Figure 6.7), the
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Figure 6.10: Throughput versus packet arrival rate for different early decision probabilities
(Security Level 1, L = 25).
packet loss ratio does not change so much when the traffic rate gets higher (Figure 6.8).
More importantly, a high queue size can cause a significant delay per packet, as shown in
Figure 6.9. We can leverage such results in practice in order to configure the queue size of
an IDPS that uses security level 1 and a probability of p = 0.3. As a practical example,
assuming that to achieve the QoS target, we require a certain performance at the IDPS
level, for example, a packet loss ratio of no more than 0.1, a processing time that does
not exceed 0.03 ms, and a throughput higher than 225 Kpps. Knowing that the incoming
traffic is fluctuating between 200 and 300 Kpps, we can infer from Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9
that setting the queue size to 10 packets achieves the required QoS.
The final set of experiments investigates the effect of the early decision probability (p)
on the different performance metrics. From Figure 6.10, it can be seen that for a high packet
arrival rate, a high value of p can increase the IDPS throughput. This can be explained by
the fact that the header analysis is able to take the decision upon the receival of the packet
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Figure 6.11: Packet loss ratio versus packet arrival rate for different early decision proba-
bilities (Security Level 1, L = 25).
without the need for a content analysis process. Thus, the throughput increases while the
average packet delay in the system is reduced. As a consequence, there are fewer packets in
the queue and the packet loss ratio is almost zero, as shown in Figure 6.11. On the other
hand, a small value of p can result in more packets being directed to the second stage,
and thereby incurring a higher time spent in the system per packet. In this case, there
are more packets waiting in the queue and the loss ratio can easily increase (Figure 6.12).
These experiments demonstrate that if the header analysis can efficiently take a decision on
the malicious traffic, thereby avoiding the second stage, it can significantly reduce packet
loss as well as the average time spent in the system. Furthermore, these results can also
help to choose the appropriate p value that can make the IPDS satisfy QoS requirements.
However, this depends on whether the administrator can control the complexity and the
accuracy of the header analysis stage.
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Figure 6.12: Average time spent in the system per packet versus packet arrival rate for
different early decision probabilities (Security Level 1, L = 25).
6.4 Conclusion
Although intrusion detection systems can shield the network from various attacks and
malicious traffic, they can have drawbacks, i.e., they can introduce significant delay and
packet loss due to their large processing stages and eventually their inappropriate config-
uration. In this chapter, we have tried to address this particular problem by evaluating
the impact of such systems on the key performance metrics. To this end, we modelled
the IDPS as an analytical queuing model based on embedded Markov chain. We also per-
formed extensive simulations that demonstrated the accuracy of the model. In addition,
we analyzed through the results the effect of the different configuration parameters of the
IDPS on network performance. This study provides concrete examples of how to tune
those parameters in order to control the impact on network performance. As such, this
model not only allows the analysis of various performance metrics at the IPDS level, but
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it can be considered a valuable tool in setting up an appropriate configuration capable
to strike a balance between guaranteeing a high security enforcement level and achieving
network performance objectives.
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Chapter 7
Elastic Cloud-based IDPS Placement
7.1 Introduction
Cloud computing has become a very cost-effective model for sharing large-scale services
over the Internet in recent years. It’s success is due to the attractive features offered
by the underlying virtualization concept, including portability, isolation, live migration,
and customizability of virtual machines [39]. Popular examples of cloud-based services
are Microsoft Azure [5], Google AppEngine [110], and Amazon Elastic Computing Cloud
(EC2) [244]. Cloud services are generally categorized into three areas: Software as a
Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). IaaS
refers to on-demand provisioning of infrastructural resources, usually in terms of VMs.
The cloud owner who offers IaaS is called an IaaS provider. Examples of IaaS providers
include Amazon EC2 [244], GoGrid [87] and Flexiscale [89]. PaaS refers to providing
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platform layer resources, including operating system support and software development
frameworks. Examples of PaaS providers include Google App Engine [110], Microsoft
Windows Azure [5] and Salesforce [90]. SaaS refers to providing on demand applications
over the Internet. Examples of SaaS providers include Rackspace [100] and SAP Business
ByDesign [68].
As cloud services are distributed in nature and provisioned through the Internet, they
are prone to security threats [44]. IDPSs can be employed as a countermeasure. Tradition-
ally, IDPSs are deployed as middleboxes at strategic places (such as the network edges)
where traffic is forced to traverse through these middleboxes. This conventional approach
is not scalable and flexible enough to cope up with increasing data traffic. Since all the
communication traffic should be routed to these middle boxes, they could be become a
bottleneck. One way to tackle this issue is to upgrade the network with more powerful
middleboxes, yet it is very costly and time consuming. Moreover, this approach is rigid
to topology changes due to tightly coupling between security and topology. Many Cloud
Providers (CPs) such as Amazon AWS, Microsoft Azure and IBM Bluemix offer Security
Function as a service (SFaaS). An Enterprise Client (EC) can deploy IDPS to cloud as
Security Functions (NFs) and leverage the pay-per-use pricing model. Thus, an EC can
eliminate the cost of provisioning NFs for peak-load on its own premises and only pay
for the actually used resources in cloud. This can greatly reduce an EC’s capital and
operational expenditures.
From a CP standpoint, a core management problem to offer SFaaS is placing IDPS
instances in cloud infrastructure, and allocate resources to these instances elastically ac-
cording to IDPS service requests and workloads. The gaol is to utilize available bandwidth
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and host resources optimally without violating Service Level Agreements (SLAs). However,
elastically allocating and releasing resources incur costs, e.g., necessary VM migrations and
corresponding service disruption [246]. An IDPS placement algorithm should consider these
overheads, as well as the overall consumption of bandwidth and host resources.
Existing works in VM placement are not suitable for the placement of IDPSs for the
reasons described by Bouet et al. [62]. Moreover, most of these works consider only a
part of the problem by optimizing either host or bandwidth resource [53]. Additionally,
the elastic IDPS placement area has not been explored sufficiently, and the few recent
works [62, 86, 226, 249] do not address the challenges that may arise due to conflicting
objectives and elasticity, as discussed below.
Conflicting Objectives: An optimal IDPS placement algorithm should minimize band-
width and host resource consumption. Host resource consumption can be minimized by
serving the IDPS request using minimum number of IDPS instances, which may be many
hops away from the source or target of the request resulting into high bandwidth consump-
tion. Bandwidth consumption, on the other hand, can be minimized by placing dedicated
IDPS instances at the source or target of each request, but in this case host resource
consumption will be high. Optimizing bandwidth resource consumption causes more host
resource consumption, and vice versa. A na¨ıve solution to optimize bandwidth consump-
tion is to install an IDPS instance for each service request at the source or target of service
traffic (if the source or target and IDPS instance reside in a same CP data-center). Besides,
to optimize host resources, a solution is to install a minimum number of IDPS instances
and routing traffic to these instances. This traffic routing consumes more bandwidth re-
sources. In other words, both solutions overlook one aspect on the other and optimize the
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utilization of one resource at the expense of the other. Therefore, the challenge is to find
a trade-off between host and bandwidth resources consumption.
Elasticity: Horizontal and vertical scaling are the prominent mechanisms for achieving
elasticity. Horizontal scaling is the installation/removal of IDPS instances, whereas vertical
scaling is theallocation/release of host and bandwidth resources to/from an IDPS instance.
In addition, live migration of IDPS instances [85] and reassignment of partial workload
to another IDPS instance [132] can be employed to scale bandwidth and host resources.
Employing these mechanisms can reduce operational cost, but each mechanism has its own
overhead. The challenge is to determine which of these elasticity mechanisms is the most
appropriate for a given workload.
To address the above challenges, we introduce the Elastic IDPS problem and propose
an efficient solution called Simple Lazy Facility Location (SLFL). Specifically:
1. We formulate the Elastic IDPS placement problem considering the challenges of con-
flicting objectives and elasticity.
2. We propose SLFL a a solution approach that optimizes placement of IDPS instances
in response to new service requests, and workload variation.
3. The effectiveness of our solution is examined through realistic experiments. The
results suggest that SLFL can accept two times more workload with 5–8% less oper-
ational cost compared to first-fit and random algorithms.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The target problem and our solution
are presented in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, respectively. The proposed solution is evaluated in
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Section 7.4. Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 7.5.
7.2 Elastic IDPS Placement
From the cloud provider perspective, an IDPS request can be modelled as follows: traffic
(stream of packets) originating from a source is routed to an IDPS instance, where the
packets are processed and forwarded to a target. If the source or target is outside the
datacenter, we can assume a border router as the source or target of the traffic. IDPS
instances reside at hosts within datacenter.
We are interested in an optimal cost-aware elastic placement of IDPS instances involving
(i) selecting an optimal set of hosts on which IDPS instances are placed (ii) optimally
allocating bandwidth resources to route service traffic, and (iii) applying the most cost-
effective elasticity mechanism.
When to elastically scale? Resources must be scaled in response to two events:
i) Demand arrival : when workload increases or a new service request is received; and ii)
Demand departure: when one unit of service traffic drops. In addition, for the sake of
simplicity, we assume that each demand consists of one unit of traffic transmitted from
its source to an IDPS instance and delivered to its target, and requires a unit of IDPS
resource to be served.
How to elastically scale? Due to the inflexibility in vertical scaling, we opt for
horizontal scaling. We also assume one IDPS instance-type. A small instance-type is
lightweight, can be easily distributed over the network and instantiated on-demand. More-
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Figure 7.1: Elasticity Mechanisms
over, having multiple instance-types can unnecessary complicate IDPS instance manage-
ment tasks. In summary, we consider following elasticity mechanisms: Installing a new
IDPS instance, Removing an existing IDPS instance, Migrating an IDPS instance, and
Reassignment of a demand to another IDPS instance.
Figure 7.1 depicts the above elasticity mechanisms. Initially in 7.1(b), traffic from 3
requests are served by a single IDPS instance v. After sometime the traffic of the first
request increases. To accommodate this new workload, a new IDPS v∗ is instantiated and
the first request is reassigned to v∗ (Figure 7.1(c)). Then, traffic of the second request
terminates, and allocated resources for this request are released. Because, v is still serving
the third request, it is migrated to a more optimal location to reduce bandwidth usage
(Figure 7.1(d)). Next, third request terminates, and IDPS instance v is removed to save
host resources (Figure 7.1(e)).
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Figure 7.2: Simplified Model
7.2.1 Notation
Data Center Network
The data center network is denoted as a graph G = (N,A), where N is a set of switches
and hosts, while A is a set of links (arcs). We identify host nodes by NH . Capacity of host
n ∈ NH is denoted by the maximum number of IDPS instances that can be installed on n.
Let cn(t) denote the available capacity of n ∈ NH at time t. Let wmn and cmn(t) represent
weight and capacity at time t of arc (m,n) ∈ A, respectively.
Demand
D(t) is the set of demands at time t. A demand d ∈ D(t) is identified by its two endpoints,
source md ∈ N and target nd ∈ N . Let demand nodes refer to sources and targets. A
demand needs a unit of traffic b and a unit IDPS resource to be served.
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IDPS instance
V (t) is the set of installed IDPS instances at time t. cv(t) denotes the number of demands
that IDPS instance v can serve at time t. As we use one instance-type, we assume the
maximum capacity is C. To show assignments of demands to IDPS instances, we use two
maps at time t: Dv(t) denoting a set of demands assigned to v and vd(t) representing the
IDPS instance to which demand d is assigned.
7.2.2 Simplified Model
We refine the above model from two aspects in order to simplify our formulation. First,
host and IDPS instance constraints are transformed to arc bandwidth capacity constraints;
second, demands are simplified:
Constraints Transformation
For each host n ∈ NH , cn(0) nodes are added, and we assume that IDPS instances are
installed on these nodes. These nodes are called IDPS nodes. Imagine an IDPS instance
v is installed on n at time t, and n still has capacity of cn(t) = 2. As shown in Figure
7.2(b), three nodes are added. Fn(t) denotes these nodes, and F (t) =
⋃
n∈NH (Fn(t)).
Each m ∈ Fn(t) is connected to n via arc (m,n). The capacity of arcs initially are set
to 2 × b × C, as at most, traffic of C number of demands enters and leaves m. These
arcs force that no traffic can enter an IDPS instance node; however, this does not change
the problem, because we can assume that the demand traffic is sent to a demand source
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from the IDPS instance node, instead of the opposite direction (Figure 7.2(c)). Let AFn (t)
represent the arcs connecting IDPS nodes to the node n, and AF (t) =
⋃
n∈NH (A
F
n (t)).
Finally, let nv(t) ∈ F (t) be the IDPS instance node hosting IDPS instance v at time t, and
NV (t) =
⋃
v∈V (t){nv(t)}.
Simplifying Demands
By previous transformation, we assume that IDPS instances send the traffic to demand
nodes. We add a node qd called Qanat to the graph for each demand d ∈ D(t). Traffic is
now received in qd instead of md and nd (Figure 7.2(d)). Let Q(t) =
⋃
d∈D(t){qd} denotes
all Qanat nodes at time t. A qd is connected to md and nd via arcs (md, qd) and (nd, qd).
The capacity of these arcs initially are set to b, and their weights are set to 0. These two
arcs ensure that if traffic reaches qd, it has met md and nd earlier.
7.2.3 Mathematical Model
A discrete-time system is considered to model the problem in which time is divided into
equal slots 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Decision Variables
Let xdmn(t) ∈ R denotes the amount of traffic for demand d on arc (m,n) ∈ A at time t.
We derive two variables ydn(t) and zn(t) from x
d
mn(t). y
d
n(t) denotes if demand d gets traffic
from IDPS instance node n. zn(t) represents if an IDPS instance is installed in node n.
114
They are defined as follows.
∀(n,m) ∈ AF (t) : ydn(t) =

1 if xdnm(t) > 0
0 otherwise
∀n ∈ F (t) : zn(t) =

1 if
∑
d∈D(t) y
d
n(t) > 0
0 otherwise
Capacity Constraint
Eq. 7.1 ensures that arcs capacities are not violated.
0 ≤
∑
d∈D(t)
xdmn(t) ≤ cmn(t) for ∀(m,n) ∈ A (7.1)
Flow Conservation Constraint
For each node n ∈ N , Eq. 7.2 guarantees that the amount of traffic entering and leaving n
are equal, where n is not an IDPS node or a Qanat.
∑
(m,n)∈A
xdmn(t)−
∑
(n,m)∈A
xdnm(t) =

−2bydn(t) if n ∈ F (t)
2b if n ∈ Q(t)
0 otherwise
(7.2)
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Pair Connectivity Constraint
Eq. 7.3 ensures that a Qanat receives traffic from an IDPS instance, so both source and
target of a demand are connected to the same IDPS instance.
∀d ∈ D(t) :
∑
n∈F (t)
ydn(t) = 1 (7.3)
Installations Cost (Cins(t))
The cost of installed IDPS instances at time t is defined by Eq. 7.4. f is the cost of host
resources consumed by an IDPS instance for each time slot.
Cins(t) = f
∑
n∈F (t)
zn(t) (7.4)
Transportation Cost (Ctr(t))
The cost of delivering demands traffic at time t is denoted by Eq. 7.5. g is the cost of a
unit of bandwidth usage for each time slot.
Ctr(t) = g
∑
d∈D(t)
∑
(m,n)∈A
xdmn(t)wmn (7.5)
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Reassignment Cost (Cre(t))
Eq. 7.6 is the cost of reassigning a set of demands at time t. hd(t) is the cost of moving state
of demand d from original IDPS instance vd(t−1) to another IDPS instance vd(t). This cost
depends on available bandwidth between these instances at time t. Here, |ydn(t−1) 6= ydn(t)|
is 1 if ydn(t− 1) 6= ydn(t) otherwise is 0.
Cre(t) =
∑
n∈F (t)∩F (t−1)
∑
d∈D(t)∩D(t−1)
(
hd(t)
|ydn(t− 1) 6= ydn(t)|
) (7.6)
Migration Cost (Cmig(t))
This is the cost of migrating a set of IDPS instances at time t. In Eq. 7.7, kv(t) is the
cost of migrating IDPS instance v from nv(t − 1) to nv(t) and depends on the available
bandwidth between these two IDPS nodes. Here, |zn(t−1) 6= zn(t)| is 1 if zn(t−1) 6= zn(t),
otherwise is 0.
Cmig(t) =
∑
n∈F (t)∩F (t−1)
(
kv(t)|zn(t− 1) 6= zn(t)|
)
(7.7)
Objective Function
The objective is to minimize Eq. 7.8.
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=0
(Cins(t) + Ctr(t) + Cre(t) + Cmig(t)) (7.8)
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The static version of the problem at hand generalizes to the NP-Hard location routing
problem (LRP) [25]. An optimal solution needs solving a dynamic version of LRP for
each time slot. Due to its intractability, it is not possible to solve the problem for large
datacenters. Thus, we break down the problem and solve it independently for each demand
arrival or departure. Let Tˆ be a time system, and at each t ∈ Tˆ , an arrival or departure
occurs. We rewrite the objective function as Eq. 7.9. Here, λt is a weight factor to balance
the transportation and installation costs with the migration and reassignment costs.
min
(∑
t∈Tˆ
(Cins(t) + Ctr(t)) +
∑
t∈Tˆ
λt(Cre(t) + Cmig(t))
)
(7.9)
Although, this problem is easier than the original one, it still generalizes to LRP. Hence,
we propose a heuristic algorithm for solving this problem in the next section.
7.3 Simple Lazy Facility Location
In this section, we describe our solution, Simple Lazy Facility Location (SLFL), including
two novel heuristics to handle arrival and departure events. For simplicity, we omit time
variable t. Also, we assume function flow(n,D∗, R∗) that finds an optimum way of routing
traffic between a node n and demands D∗, and stores the routes in R∗. This function can
find R∗ in polynomial time by solving the single-commodity min-cost flow problem [136].
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7.3.1 Demand Arrival
Upon new demand d arrival, a combination of installation, migrations and reassignments
can be applied to optimize the placement. Because in most cases the arrival affects its
locality, an algorithm that locally optimizes the placement is developed. This algorithm
considers three possible actions (i) assignment to an existing IDPS instance, (ii) migration
and (iii) creating a new IDPS instance followed by a set of reassignments. The first action
assigns d to an existing IDPS instance with the minimum transportation cost. For the two
other actions, migration potential and installation potential metrics are defined as follows:
Migration potential is the difference between current transportation cost of Dv and
transportation cost of Dv ∪ {d} after possible migration of v to node n. Function potmig,
defined in algorithm 2, finds this potential and stores routes in R∗.
Algorithm 2 Migration Potential
1: function potmig(v, n,R
∗)
2: C ← Transportation cost of Dv;
3: C∗ ← g × flow(n,Dv ∪ {d}, R∗) + λ× kv;
4: return (C − C∗) if (C∗ is not ∞), otherwise −∞;
5: end function
Installation potential is the difference between the operational cost before and after
installing an IDPS instance in node n. We consider a set of reassignments during installa-
tion. Function potins, as defined in Algorithm 3, computes the installation potential for a
node n, finds candidate demands D∗ for reassignment, and stores routes in R∗.
Algorithm 4 shows how SLFL handles a demand arrival. The cost of the best assignment
is found (lines 3-4). The best migration and installation potential are computed (lines 4-
8). If the best installation potential is greater than the best migration potential, a new
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Algorithm 3 Installation Potential
1: function potins(n,R
∗)
2: e∗ ← −g × flow(n, {d}, R∗); D∗ ← ∅;
3: for j = 1 to C − 1 do
4: d∗ ← Find best next demand to reassign;
5: e← C − (g × flow(n,D∗ ∪ {d, d∗},R) + λ× hd∗);
6: break if (e ≤ 0 or e ≤ e∗);
7: e∗ ← e; D∗ ← D∗ ∪ {d∗}; R∗ ← R;
8: end for
9: return (e∗ − f , D∗);
10: end function
IDPS v is instantiated and demands Dre are reassigned to v (lines 9-14). Otherwise, IDPS
instance vmig is migrated to nmig (lines 14-18). Finally, in the lack of potential to change,
d is assigned to IDPS instance vasn.
7.3.2 Demand Departure
Similar to an arrival event, SLFL locally optimizes the placement of IDPS instances upon
departure of demand d. Assume that d was assigned to IDPS instance v. Two actions are
considered: (i) migration of v, and (ii) removal of v. We define migration potential and
removal potential metrics for migration and removal of v as follows:
migration potential, as defined in Algorithm 5, is the difference in transportation cost
of Dv before and after migration of v to node n.
Removal potential is the difference in operational-cost before and after the removal
of v. Similar to installation potential, a set of reassignments are considered. Function
potrmv, defined in Algorithm 6, computes the removal potential of v, finds candidate IDPS
instances Vre for reassignment of Dv, and stores routes in R
∗.
120
Algorithm 4 SLFL-Demand Arrival
1: function DemandArrival(d)
2: D ← D ∪ {d};
3: vasn ← arg minv∈V {flow(nv, {d}, ∅)}
4: pasn ← g × flow(nvasg , {d}, R∗asg);
5: (vmig, nmig)← arg maxv∈V :n∈F {potmig(v, n, ∅)};
6: emig ← potmig(vmig, R∗mig);
7: nins ← arg maxn∈F/NV {potins(n, ∅)};
8: (eins, Dre)← potins(nins, R∗ins);
9: if (eins > −pasn) and (eins ≥ emig) then
10: u← install a facility at nins;
11: Reassign ∀d ∈ Dre and assign d to u;
12: Route related traffic based on R∗ins;
13: V ← V ∪ {u};
14: else if emig > −pasn then
15: Migrate vmig to node nmig;
16: Assign d to vmig;
17: Route traffic based on R∗mig;
18: else
19: Assign d to vasn;
20: Route traffic based on R∗asg;
21: end if
22: end function
Algorithm 5 Emigration Potential
1: function potemg(v, n,R
∗)
2: C ← Transportation cost of Dv;
3: C∗ ← g × flow(n,Dv, R∗) + λ× kv;
4: return (C − C∗) if C∗ is not ∞, otherwise −∞;
5: end function
121
Algorithm 6 Removing Potential
1: function potrmv(v,R
∗)
2: {Dre, Vre} ← {∅, ∅}; e∗ ← f ;
3: C ← Transportation cost of Dv;
4: C∗ ← 0; U ← V/{v};
5: for all dv ∈ Dv do
6: vre ← best IDPS instance for reassignment of dv;
7: C∗ ← C∗ + g × flow(nvre , {i}, R∗re) + λ× hdv ;
8: if C∗ is ∞ then
9: e∗ ← 0; {Dre, Vre} ← {∅, ∅};
10: break;
11: end if
12: {Vre, Dre} ← {Vre ∪ vre, Dre ∪ d};
13: R∗ ← R∗ ∪R∗re;
14: end for
15: return
(
e∗ + (C − C∗), {Dre, Vre}
)
;
16: end function
Finally, algorithm 7 defines how SLFL handles a demand departure. First, v’s resources
assigned to d are released (line 2). Then, the best node to migrate and migration potential
are computed (lines 3-4). The removal potential and possible reassignments are determined
(line 5). If removal potential is positive and greater than migration potential, v is removed
and its demands are reassigned to other IDPS instances (lines 6-12). Otherwise, if migration
potential is positive, v is migrated to a more optimal node (lines 13-16).
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Algorithm 7 SLFL-Demand Departure
1: function DemandDeparture(d, v)
2: Release v’s resources assigned to d;
3: nemg ← arg maxn∈F/NV {potemg(v, n, ∅)};
4: eemg ← potemg(v, nemg, R∗emg);
5: (ermv, {Dre, Vre})← potrmv(v,R∗rmv);
6: if (ermv > 0) and (ermv > eemg) then
7: V ← V/{v};
8: Remove facility v;
9: for all {dre, vre} ∈ {Dre, Vre} do
10: Reassign dre to vre;
11: end for
12: Route traffic based to R∗rmv;
13: else if eemg > 0 then
14: Migrate v to the node nemg;
15: Route traffic based to R∗emg;
16: end if
17: end function
7.4 Evaluation
7.4.1 Experimental Setup
We have implemented SLFL and evaluated its performance by simulations on a data center
topology with 54 hosts. We used a 6-ary Fat-tree topology [23] providing full bisection
bandwidth. Each host has 8 CPU cores, 8GB of memory, and contains a 1Gbps network
adapter. A host CPU consumes 140W of power at electricity cost of ¢11 per kWh. We
select Bro IDS [223] as a representative IDPS providing a capacity of 80 Mbps. We assume
that Bro can be installed on a VM which requires 1 vCPU and, 1GB of RAM. In regards
to bandwidth, we set the cost of using a unit of bandwidth for a link to 20% of the power
consumption cost. Regrading live migration, the full contents of IDPS instance’s memory
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Figure 7.3: Workload Acceptance
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Figure 7.4: Bandwidth Resource Utilization
(1GB) is transported. Reassignment involves transporting a fraction of an IDPS instance’s
memory. This fraction is relative to the IDPS instance’s maximum capacity.
We model demand arrival using Poisson distribution with an average rate of 1 demand
per second. The lifetime of a demand follows an exponential distribution with an average
of 1800 seconds. Demand nodes are uniformly distributed in the data-center network. We
set b = 20Mbps and λ = 1.
We compare SLFL with random and first fit algorithms. Upon a demand arrival, ran-
dom algorithm randomly selects an IDPS instance with sufficient available bandwidth.
Otherwise, an IDPS instance is installed in a not-saturated host. First-fit algorithm se-
lects the first not-saturated IDPS instance with adequate available bandwidth. If not, an
IDPS instance is installed in the first not-saturated host. Upon demand departure, both
algorithms remove an IDPS instance if this IDPS instance has no assigned demand.
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Figure 7.5: Host Resource Utilization
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Figure 7.6: IDPS Resource Utilization
7.4.2 Acceptance and Utilization
Figures 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 depict workload acceptance and resources utilization. As
shown in 7.3, SLFL accepts 97% of workload whereas random and first-fit accept 48%
and 45% of workload, respectively. Bandwidth, host, and IDPS resource utilization are
depicted in 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6, respectively. Random and first-fit approaches quickly exhaust
bandwidth resources (utilization of 94% and 92%, respectively) resulting into low host re-
source utilization (45% and 44%, respectively). Moreover, these algorithms utilize 88% and
87% of IDPS resources, respectively. SLFL achieves bandwidth, host and IDPS resource
utilization of 82%, 91% and 98%, respectively.
Operational costs are reported in Figures 7.7, 7.8, 7.9, and 7.10. Compared to random
and first-fit algorithms, SLFL incurs 9% and 4% less operational cost (7.7), and pays 22%
and 19% less bandwidth cost (7.8), respectively. However, SLFL incurs two times more
installation cost (7.9) compared to the random and first-fit algorithms. The reason is that
SLFL accepts two times more workload than the other approaches. Finally, 7.10 shows
the overhead of SLFL. SLFL does reassignments more frequently than migrations. The
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Figure 7.7: Total Operational Cost
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Figure 7.8: Transportation Cost
reason is that reassignment requires transmission of a part of IDPS instance state, whereas
migration requires transmission of the entire memory of an IDPS instance.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced Elastic IDPS Placement problem and presented a
model for minimizing operational costs in providing IDPS as a service. We considered the
elasticity overhead and the trade-off between bandwidth and host resource consumption.
We developed and evaluated an algorithm, named SLFL, to solve this problem in polyno-
mial time. Our experiments suggest that by taking both bandwidth and host resources into
consideration, and by carefully selecting the right elasticity mechanism, SLFL can accept
∼ 2× more workload in comparison to first-fit and random algorithms. Additionally, SLFL
incurs 5–8% less operational cost.
126
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
30
00
0
35
00
0
40
00
0
Time (s)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
C
os
t
(¢p
er
20
0
se
c.
) Random
SLFL
FirstFit
Figure 7.9: Installation Cost
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Figure 7.10: SLFL Overhead
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future work
Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs) are software/hardware systems de-
signed to monitor network traffic or computer activities and generate alerts when suspicious
intrusions are detected. IDPSs can prevent intrusions to be successful attacks by blocking
them using various methods. Although many IDPS systems have been proposed in the
past, their configuration and management for effective detection and prevention of attacks
are still challenging tasks. This is mainly because of the significant degradation of system
performance when maximum security is applied; hence arises the need to trade off between
security enforcement levels on one hand and the performance and usability of an enterprise
information system on the other. In this thesis, we discussed the challenges underlying
the design and management of intrusion detection and prevention systems. Specifically,
we highlighted the open research issues raised by the conflict between security and perfor-
mance, and the importance of dynamic adaptation and reconfiguration to reconcile them.
In this perspective, we proposed several mechanisms to address these key issues, including
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policy-based adaptation, performance analysis, trade-offs in configuration management,
resource management, and elastic resource allocation.
For policy-based adaptation, we proposed a policy-based framework (AdapSec) in
Chapter 3 for adaptive security configuration management of IDPSs. AdapSec provides
policy-based dynamic adaptation and reconfiguration of the deployed levels of security
measures. Policies are used to define and dynamically maintain the right balance between
effective security and system usability/performance. We evaluated AdapSec through ex-
periments on a testbed including Snort and FireCol .
For performance analysis (Chapter 4), we proposed a probabilistic model to investigate
the relationship between the IDPS performance and its configuration. We showed that
applying different sets of rules categories and configuration parameters impacts the average
service time and affects system security. In addition, we proposed in Chapter 5 a rule
mode selection optimization technique that determines the IDPS configuration set that
maximizes the security enforcement levels while avoiding unnecessary network performance
degradations. The proposed technique analyses the impact of the detection rates (i.e., FP
and FN) on the performance of the IDPS.
For resource management, we developed an embedded Markov chain model (Chapter
6) to analyze the performance of the IDPS for different configurations and under different
traffic characteristics. This study showed how to predict the impact of the IDPS parameters
on network performance and provided concrete examples of how to tune those parameters.
The evaluation of our models (Chapter 4, 5, and 6) was performed using a discrete-event
simulation tool developed under Matlab.
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Finally, we leveraged the elasticity of resource allocation in cloud computing environ-
ments to optimize the placement of IDPS appliances in response to new service requests,
and workload variation (Chapter 7) and thereby achieve dynamic IDPS scaling. We believe
the later capability is helpful in dynamically balancing security and performance objectives.
The contribution of this thesis is four folds. First, we applied probabilistic performance
and queueing theoretical modelling to solve intrusion detection problems. Second, we
introduced the concept of dynamic IDPS to achieve a balance between a high security
enforcement level and network performance objectives. Third, we presented a model for
minimizing operational costs in providing IDPS as a service in the Cloud. Fourth, we
proposed a rule mode selection optimization technique to determine appropriate IDPS
configurations.
Possible future work includes: (1) Develop the architecture components not addressed
in this thesis, namely the alert management component and the monitoring module; (2)
Extend AdapSec to consider attack graphs, attack statistical relationships, and learning
mechanisms to define effective adaptation policies and security levels; (3) Evaluate the
impact of potential damage D(ri) and operational loss L(ri) parameters on performance;
(4) Investigate the performance of different resource management solutions to mitigate DoS
attacks targeting worst case scenario in the IDPS ruleset; (5) Consider the use of feedback
control-theoretic approaches for dynamic adjustment of IDPS configurations. This way,
AdapSec will be able to cope with network traffic dynamics while balancing the security-
performance trade-off in an autonomic manner; (6) Investigate the use of software-defined
networking (SDN) to enhance IDPS dynamic scaling, for example by steering demand
request to IDPS instances using SDN.
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